An extension of the Nash bargaining problem and the Nash social welfare function

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamoru Kaneko
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

A New Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem

Econometrica ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 1163 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. L. Brito ◽  
A. M. Buoncristiani ◽  
M. D. Intriligator
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

LEARNING BARGAINING CONVENTIONS

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 237-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Focal Point ◽  
Inductive Learning ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Division Problems ◽  
Egalitarian Solution ◽  
Bargaining Problems ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem ◽  
Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty

2014 ◽  
Vol 115 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-274
Author(s):  
Sanxi Li ◽  
Hailin Sun ◽  
Jianye Yan ◽  
Xundong Yin
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points

Econometrica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 961 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvi Safra ◽  
Lin Zhou ◽  
Itzhak Zilcha
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

Remittances and the Politics of Austerity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Germano
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Global Markets ◽  
Welfare Programs ◽  
Social Instability ◽  
Social Welfare Programs ◽  
Poor Families ◽  
International Migrants

Remittances sent by international migrants have become an increasingly important source of social welfare in the developing world. This chapter explores what remittances are, why migrants send them, and how poor families use them. I argue in this chapter that remittances are more than just gifts from one relative to another. They play a larger social welfare role that complements funds that governments spend on social welfare programs. This social welfare function has become particularly important in recent decades as developing countries have prioritized austerity and integrated into volatile global markets. I argue that by filling a welfare gap in an age of austerity, remittances help to reduce the suffering and anger that so often trigger political and social instability during times of economic crisis.

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