Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points

Econometrica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 961 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvi Safra ◽  
Lin Zhou ◽  
Itzhak Zilcha
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty

2014 ◽  
Vol 115 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-274
Author(s):  
Sanxi Li ◽  
Hailin Sun ◽  
Jianye Yan ◽  
Xundong Yin
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

A New Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem

Econometrica ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 1163 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. L. Brito ◽  
A. M. Buoncristiani ◽  
M. D. Intriligator
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem

LEARNING BARGAINING CONVENTIONS

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 237-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Focal Point ◽  
Inductive Learning ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Bargaining Problem ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Division Problems ◽  
Egalitarian Solution ◽  
Bargaining Problems ◽  
Nash Bargaining Problem ◽  
Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

Abstract:I examine from a conventionalist perspective the Nash bargaining problem that philosophers use as a tool for analyzing fair division. From this perspective, the solutions to bargaining problems are conventions that can emerge from inductive learning and focal point effects. I contrast the conventionalist approach to analyzing the bargaining problem with the better-known rational choice approach, which I criticize for having overly demanding epistemic presuppositions and for producing disappointing results. I apply a simple model of inductive learning to specific bargaining problems to show that agents can learn from repeated experience to follow a variety of bargaining conventions in a given problem. I conclude that such agents can come to regard two such conventions as focal for the bargaining problem, one that assigns claimants equal shares of a good and another egalitarian solution of equal payoff gains, and that the egalitarian solution tends to prevail when these two solutions differ. I conclude further that the above analysis lends support for admitting interpersonal utility comparisons into the analysis of fair division problems, and also suggests a focal point explanation of the wide acceptance of the Aristotelian proportionality principle of distributive justice.

scholarly journals Risk aversion for losses and the Nash bargaining solution

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Peters
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Nash Bargaining Solution ◽  
Axiomatic Characterization ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Disagreement Point ◽  
Theoretic Characterization

AbstractWe call a decision maker risk averse for losses if that decision maker is risk averse with respect to lotteries having alternatives below a given reference alternative in their support. A two-person bargaining solution is called invariant under risk aversion for losses if the assigned outcome does not change after correcting for risk aversion for losses with this outcome as pair of reference levels, provided that the disagreement point only changes proportionally. We present an axiomatic characterization of the Nash bargaining solution based on this condition, and we also provide a decision-theoretic characterization of the concept of risk aversion for losses.

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