A Noncooperative Model of Bargaining in Simple Spatial Games

1991 ◽  
pp. 80-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Laing
Keyword(s):  
2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 3504-3506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Han-Xin ◽  
Wang Bing-Hong ◽  
Wang Wen-Xu ◽  
Rong Zhi-Hai
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Peña ◽  
Bin Wu ◽  
Arne Traulsen

AbstractSpatial structure greatly affects the evolution of cooperation. While in two-player games the condition for cooperation to evolve depends on a single structure coefficient, in multiplayer games the condition might depend on several structure coefficients, making it difficult to compare different population structures. We propose a solution to this issue by introducing two simple ways of ordering population structures: the containment order and the volume order. If population structure 𝒮1 is greater than population structure 𝒮2 in the containment or the volume order, then 𝒮1 can be considered a stronger promoter of cooperation. We provide conditions for establishing the containment order, give general results on the volume order, and illustrate our theory by comparing different models of spatial games and associated update rules. Our results hold for a large class of population structures and can be easily applied to specific cases once the structure coefficients have been calculated or estimated.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (12) ◽  
pp. 123401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Jing Li ◽  
Luo-Luo Jiang ◽  
Changgui Gu ◽  
Huijie Yang

2006 ◽  
pp. 145-166
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Robert M. May ◽  
Sebastian Bohoeffer ◽  
Martin A. Nowak

2012 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Xiaodan Zhu ◽  
Jeferson J. Arenzon
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (168) ◽  
pp. 20200174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danyang Jia ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Zhao Song ◽  
Ivan Romić ◽  
Xuelong Li ◽  
...  

The progression of game theory from classical to evolutionary and spatial games provided a powerful means to study cooperation, and enabled a better understanding of general cooperation-promoting mechanisms. However, current standard models assume that at any given point players must choose either cooperation or defection, meaning that regardless of the spatial structure in which they exist, they cannot differentiate between their neighbours and adjust their behaviour accordingly. This is at odds with interactions among organisms in nature who are well capable of behaving differently towards different members of their communities. We account for this natural fact by introducing a new type of player—dubbed link players—who can adjust their behaviour to each individual neighbour. This is in contrast to more common node players whose behaviour affects all neighbours in the same way. We proceed to study cooperation in pure and mixed populations, showing that cooperation peaks at moderately low densities of link players. In such conditions, players naturally specialize in different roles. Node players tend to be either cooperators or defectors, while link players form social insulation between cooperative and defecting clusters by acting both as cooperators and defectors. Such fairly complex processes emerging from a simple model reflect some of the complexities observed in experimental studies on social behaviour in microbes and pave a way for the development of richer game models.


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