spatial games
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2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dmitriy Antonov ◽  
Evgeni Burovski ◽  
Lev Shchur
Keyword(s):  


Author(s):  
Jeffrey West ◽  
Yongqian Ma ◽  
Artem Kaznatcheev ◽  
Alexander R A Anderson

Abstract   Evolutionary game theory describes frequency-dependent selection for fixed, heritable strategies in a population of competing individuals using a payoff matrix. We present a software package to aid in the construction, analysis, and visualization of three-strategy matrix games. The IsoMaTrix package computes the isoclines (lines of zero growth) of matrix games, and facilitates direct comparison of well-mixed dynamics to structured populations on a lattice grid. IsoMaTrix computes fixed points, phase flow, trajectories, (sub)velocities, and uncertainty quantification for stochastic effects in spatial matrix games. We describe a result obtained via IsoMaTrix’s spatial games functionality, which shows that the timing of competitive release in a cancer model (under continuous treatment) critically depends on the initial spatial configuration of the tumor. Availability The code is available at: https://github.com/mathonco/isomatrix. Supplementary information Supplementary data are available at Bioinformatics online.



2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (168) ◽  
pp. 20200174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danyang Jia ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Zhao Song ◽  
Ivan Romić ◽  
Xuelong Li ◽  
...  

The progression of game theory from classical to evolutionary and spatial games provided a powerful means to study cooperation, and enabled a better understanding of general cooperation-promoting mechanisms. However, current standard models assume that at any given point players must choose either cooperation or defection, meaning that regardless of the spatial structure in which they exist, they cannot differentiate between their neighbours and adjust their behaviour accordingly. This is at odds with interactions among organisms in nature who are well capable of behaving differently towards different members of their communities. We account for this natural fact by introducing a new type of player—dubbed link players—who can adjust their behaviour to each individual neighbour. This is in contrast to more common node players whose behaviour affects all neighbours in the same way. We proceed to study cooperation in pure and mixed populations, showing that cooperation peaks at moderately low densities of link players. In such conditions, players naturally specialize in different roles. Node players tend to be either cooperators or defectors, while link players form social insulation between cooperative and defecting clusters by acting both as cooperators and defectors. Such fairly complex processes emerging from a simple model reflect some of the complexities observed in experimental studies on social behaviour in microbes and pave a way for the development of richer game models.



2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daiki Miyagawa ◽  
Genki Ichinose ◽  
Erika Chiba ◽  
Hiroki Sayama




2019 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 87-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martha Mitsopoulou ◽  
Nikolaos I. Dourvas ◽  
Georgios Ch. Sirakoulis ◽  
Katsuhiro Nishinari


Author(s):  
Shane Auerbach ◽  
Rebekah Dix
Keyword(s):  


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Hurlbut ◽  
Ethan Ortega ◽  
Igor Erovenko ◽  
Jonathan Rowell

The development of a cancerous tumor requires affected cells to collectively display an assortment of characteristic behaviors that contribute differently to its growth. A heterogeneous population of tumor cells is far more resistant to treatment than a homogeneous one as different cell types respond dissimilarly to treatments; yet, these cell types are also in competition with one another. This paper models heterogeneous cancer cell interactions within the tumor mass through several game theoretic approaches including classical normal form games, replicator dynamics, and spatial games. Our concept model community consists of four cell strategies: an angiogenesis-factor-producing cell, a proliferative cell, a cytotoxin producing cell, and a neutral stromal cell. By comparing pairwise strategic interactions, invasibility and counter-invasibility, we establish conditions for dominance and the existence of both monomorphic and polymorphic equilibria. The spatial game supports co-occurrence among multiple subpopulations in accordance with biological observations of developing tumors. As the tumor progresses from primarily stromal cells to a more malignant state, angiogenic and cytotoxic cells form clusters while proliferative cells are widespread. The clustering of certain subpopulations suggests insight into the behaviors of cancer cells that could influence future treatment strategies.



2018 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shakti N. Menon ◽  
V. Sasidevan ◽  
Sitabhra Sinha


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