Tit for tat: costly punishment in manifest Huntington’s disease

Objective: We aimed to investigate costly punishment in patients with HD. Background: Huntington’s disease (HD) is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative disease with motor, cognitive, and psychiatric symptoms. As neuropsychiatric abnormalities often precede motor symptoms, we wanted to assess whether costly punishment is part of the neuropsychological profile of patients with HD. Methods: A total of 40 non demented subjects were prospectively enrolled in this study with a between-subject design comparing manifest HD patients (n=18) to healthy controls (HC; n=22). All participants performed eight rounds of a costly punishment task, in which money was shared unevenly in 5 rounds or in a fair manner in the remaining three rounds. Participants then had to decide whether they wanted to punish the trustee. Furthermore, all participants underwent neuropsychological background tasks. Results: HD patients performed worse in the neuropsychological background tests compared to HC (all p-values<0.05). Moreover, HD patients punished more often in fair (Wald x2=5.03, p=0.025) but not in unfair rounds (Wald x2=1.63, p=0.202). Conclusions: Our results demonstrate increased costly punishment during fair conditions in HD patients. Whether this behaviour is due to a lack of recognition of social norms, an impairment in top-down inhibition, or an effect of anti-dopaminergic medication remains unclear.

Parents’ Political Ideology Predicts How Their Children Punish

People often punish others for violations that do not affect them directly, even at a cost to themselves. Various motivations exist for costly punishment: people may punish to enforce cooperative norms (amplifying punishment of in-groups) or to express anger at perpetrators (amplifying punishment of out-groups). This suggests that group-related values and attitudes (e.g., how much one values fairness or feels out-group hostility) might shape the emergence of group-based punishment. The present studies (N=269, ages 3-8) tested whether children’s punishment varies according to parents’ political ideology—a proxy for the value systems and attitudes transmitted to children intergenerationally. Parental conservatism was associated with decreased punishment of in-groups, and, at the ends of the ideological spectrum, children of more conservative parents punished out-groups more than in-groups, whereas children of more liberal parents did the opposite. These findings demonstrate how variation in group-related ideologies shapes punishment across generations.

Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information

Deterrence, a defender’s avoidance of a challenger’s attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obtaining information on reputation. Even for small information costs successful deterrence is never evolutionarily stable. Here we use game-theoretic modelling and agent-based simulations to resolve this puzzle and to clarify under which conditions deterrence can nevertheless evolve and when it is bound to fail. Paradoxically, rich information on defenders’ past actions leads to a breakdown of deterrence, while with only minimal information deterrence can be highly successful. We argue that reputation-based deterrence sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights.

Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

To determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

Egoistic punishment outcompetes altruistic punishment in the spatial public goods game

The evolution of costly punishment is a puzzle due to cooperators’ second-order free-riding. Previous studies have proposed many solutions mainly focused on reducing the punishment cost or punishing second-order free riders directly or indirectly. We attempt to explain this confusion from the perspective of punishment motivation, which is why the punisher is willing to pay the cost. The answer is that the punisher is egoistic. Egoistic punishment aims to protect punishers’ own cooperative benefits shared by the defectors. In such case, egoistic punishers would pay a cost in punishing defectors and retrieve lost payoffs from defectors. Here, we examined the evolution and performance of egoistic punishment and compared it with typical altruistic punishment using classic peer-punishment and pool-punishment modes. Results showed egoistic punishment can evolve and effectively promote cooperation within a large parameter range, whether in a well-mixed or structured population, or through peer-punishment or pool-punishment modes. This result is also robust to different strategy-updating rules. The evolution under the pool-punishment mechanism is more complicated. The influence of parameters is counter-intuitive because of cycle dominance; namely, the cost is the key factor to control the level of cooperation and the fine determines the ratio of the punishers and cooperators. Compared with altruistic punishment, egoistic punishment can promote cooperation in a lower-fine and higher-cost area, especially in the pool punishment mode, and the egoistic punishers have stronger survivability. Egoistic punishers represent the natural fairness in a social system. Results revealed that focusing on individual equity can significantly promote collective cooperation. This study provides another explanation for the evolution of costly punishment.

Let´s call it altruism ! A psychological perspective and hierarchical framework of altruism and prosocial behavior

“Altruism” is a term used by many disciplines like biology, economics, sociology and psychology that varies in its definition even by researchers in the same field. This lack of common ground concerning the definition has often led to misunderstandings due to the different approaches taken by researchers from various fields. In this work, we propose a hierarchical model of prosocial behavior that provides an overview on the hierarchical structure and position of several definitions of altruism provided by researchers from several disciplines. The highest hierarchical level is helping behavior that comprises both voluntary and involuntary behavior of benefit for others. The next hierarchical level is the general category of prosocial behavior, which is voluntary helping and yet independent from the reasons or motivation to help. The subsequent level of the hierarchy on the one hand defines different kinds of prosocial behavior in humans according to the source of general motivation being for example motivated by empathy, external rewards like reputation, or even by anger in case of costly punishment. On the other hand, on the same level, a differentiation using concepts from evolutionary perspectives grounds this very influential approach to prosocial behavior. Social interaction rules according to social exchange theory and situationally specific motivational aspects of prosocial behavior define further lower hierarchical levels. We propose this model to create a common ground for communication as well as to spread the awareness of the hierarchical differences in the different definitions of the term “altruism” in various fields of research.

Inclusive groups can avoid the tragedy of the commons

The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons (Hardin in Science 162:1243–1248, 1968). In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment (Helbing et al. in New J Phys 12:083005, 2010) presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. The selfishness of the group members favors defectors. Here we show that including other members of the groups and sharing rewards with them can be another incentive for cooperation, avoiding the cost required for punishment. Further, we show how punishment and this form of inclusiveness interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.

Altruistic Punishment: The Golden Keystone of Human Cooperation and Social Stability?

‘Altruistic punishment’ (i.e., costly punishment that serves no instrumental goal for the punisher) could serve, as suggested by the pertinent experimental literature, as a powerful enforcer of social norms. This paper discusses foundations, extensions, and, in particular, limits and open questions of this concept-and it does so mostly based on experimental evidence provided by the author. Inter alia, the paper relates the (standard) literature on negative emotions as a trigger of second party punishment to more recent experimental findings on the phenomenon of ‘spontaneous cooperation’ and ‘spontaneous punishment’ and demonstrates its (tight) emotional basis. Furthermore, the paper discusses the potential for free riding on altruistic punishment. While providing valuable insights into the understanding of social order, ‘altruistic punishment’ is thus not the golden keystone of social stability.