Evolutionarily stable strategies in competition for resource intake rate maximization

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryszard Korona
Keyword(s):  
Intake Rate ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Rate Maximization ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Evolutionarily Stable Strategies for Consuming a Structured Resource

2000 ◽  
Vol 155 (1) ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Wilson ◽  
Richards
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Stay Times in Scatophaga and the Theory of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

1986 ◽  
Vol 128 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Curtsinger
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

scholarly journals Evolutionary Stability for Interactions among Kin under Quantitative Inheritance.

Genetics ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 121 (4) ◽  
pp. 877-889
Author(s):  
A B Harper
Keyword(s):  
Inclusive Fitness ◽  
Fitness Function ◽  
Quantitative Inheritance ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environmental Variance ◽  
Pairwise Interactions ◽  
Simplifying Assumptions ◽  
Multilocus Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Abstract The theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) predicts the long-term evolutionary outcome of frequency-dependent selection by making a number of simplifying assumptions about the genetic basis of inheritance. I use a symmetrized multilocus model of quantitative inheritance without mutation to analyze the results of interactions between pairs of related individuals and compare the equilibria to those found by ESS analysis. It is assumed that the fitness changes due to interactions can be approximated by the exponential of a quadratic surface. The major results are the following. (1) The evolutionarily stable phenotypes found by ESS analysis are always equilibria of the model studied here. (2) When relatives interact, one of the two conditions for stability of equilibria differs between the two models; this can be accounted for by positing that the inclusive fitness function for quantitative characters is slightly different from the inclusive fitness function for characters determined by a single locus. (3) The inclusion of environmental variance will in general change the equilibrium phenotype, but the equilibria of ESS analysis are changed to the same extent by environmental variance. (4) A class of genetically polymorphic equilibria occur, which in the present model are always unstable. These results expand the range of conditions under which one can validly predict the evolution of pairwise interactions using ESS analysis.

Conditions for evolutionarily stable strategies

1980 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 559-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andris Abakuks
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

It is pointed out that the conditions given by Haigh (1975) for finding evolutionarily stable strategies corresponding to a given matrix are sufficient, but not always necessary. An example is given, and an amended version of the necessary and sufficient conditions is stated.

On Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Zhang ◽  
Yaqi Hao ◽  
Daizhan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

scholarly journals Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Peng He ◽  
Feifei Xu ◽  
Chunming (Victor) Shi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Tourism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Cost Advantage ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Green Tourism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

scholarly journals Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons

2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergiu Hart ◽  
Yosef Rinott ◽  
Benjamin Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Random Polygons ◽  
Random Games ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Random evolutionarily stable strategies

1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Auslander ◽  
J. Guckenheimer ◽  
G. Oster
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable
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