scholarly journals Evolutionary Stability for Interactions among Kin under Quantitative Inheritance.

Genetics ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 121 (4) ◽  
pp. 877-889
Author(s):  
A B Harper
Keyword(s):  
Inclusive Fitness ◽  
Fitness Function ◽  
Quantitative Inheritance ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environmental Variance ◽  
Pairwise Interactions ◽  
Simplifying Assumptions ◽  
Multilocus Model ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Abstract The theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) predicts the long-term evolutionary outcome of frequency-dependent selection by making a number of simplifying assumptions about the genetic basis of inheritance. I use a symmetrized multilocus model of quantitative inheritance without mutation to analyze the results of interactions between pairs of related individuals and compare the equilibria to those found by ESS analysis. It is assumed that the fitness changes due to interactions can be approximated by the exponential of a quadratic surface. The major results are the following. (1) The evolutionarily stable phenotypes found by ESS analysis are always equilibria of the model studied here. (2) When relatives interact, one of the two conditions for stability of equilibria differs between the two models; this can be accounted for by positing that the inclusive fitness function for quantitative characters is slightly different from the inclusive fitness function for characters determined by a single locus. (3) The inclusion of environmental variance will in general change the equilibrium phenotype, but the equilibria of ESS analysis are changed to the same extent by environmental variance. (4) A class of genetically polymorphic equilibria occur, which in the present model are always unstable. These results expand the range of conditions under which one can validly predict the evolution of pairwise interactions using ESS analysis.

scholarly journals The property ‘instinct’

2004 ◽  
Vol 359 (1451) ◽  
pp. 1763-1774 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zeki ◽  
O. R. Goodenough ◽  
Jeffrey Evans Stake
Keyword(s):  
Reproductive Success ◽  
Genetic Predisposition ◽  
Inclusive Fitness ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Temporal Priority ◽  
Property Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Made In

Evolutionary theory and empirical studies suggest that many animals, including humans, have a genetic predisposition to acquire and retain property. This is hardly surprising because survival is closely bound up with the acquisition of things: food, shelter, tools and territory. But the root of these general urges may also run to quite specific and detailed rules about property acquisition, retention and disposition. The great variation in property-related behaviours across species may mask some important commonalities grounded in adaptive utility. Experiments and observations in the field and laboratory suggest that the legal rules of temporal priority and possession are grounded in what were evolutionarily stable strategies in the ancestral environment. Moreover, the preferences that humans exhibit in disposing of their property on their deaths, both by dispositions made in wills and by the laws of intestacy, tend to advance reproductive success as a result of inclusive fitness pay-offs.

Der Wald-Wild-Konflikt – was kann die Forstökonomie zur Lösung beitragen? (Essay)

2017 ◽  
Vol 168 (4) ◽  
pp. 181-185
Author(s):  
Marc Hanewinkel
Keyword(s):  
Forest Economics ◽  
Production Risk ◽  
Damage Compensation ◽  
Land Expectation Value ◽  
Compensation Methods ◽  
The Future ◽  
Single Tree Selection ◽  
Simplifying Assumptions ◽  
Forest Enterprises

The forest-game conflict – how can forest economics contribute to solve it? (Essay) Core parameters of forest economics such as land expectation value or highest revenue show that damage caused by wild ungulates can critically influence the economic success of forest enterprises. When assessing and evaluating the damage in order to calculate damage compensation, methods are applied in Germany that look either into the past (“cost value methods”) or into the future (“expected value methods”). The manifold uncertainties related to this evaluation over long-term production periods are taken into account within a framework of conventions through strongly simplifying assumptions. Only lately, the increased production risk due to game-induced loss of species diversity is also considered. Additional aspects that should be taken into account in the future are the loss of climate-adapted species, the change of the insurance values of forest ecosystems and the impossibility of specific management systems such as single-tree selection forestry due to the influence of game. Because of high transaction costs when assessing the damage, financial compensation should only be the “ultimate measure” and a meditation between stakeholder groups with the goal to find a cooperative solution before the damage occurs should be preferred.

scholarly journals Branching processes with interactions: subcritical cooperative regime

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-278
Author(s):  
Adrián González Casanova ◽  
Juan Carlos Pardo ◽  
José Luis Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Population Genetics ◽  
Branching Processes ◽  
Jump Diffusion ◽  
Pairwise Interaction ◽  
Pairwise Interactions ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Interesting Object ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Dynamics Of Populations

AbstractIn this paper, we introduce a family of processes with values on the nonnegative integers that describes the dynamics of populations where individuals are allowed to have different types of interactions. The types of interactions that we consider include pairwise interactions, such as competition, annihilation, and cooperation; and interactions among several individuals that can be viewed as catastrophes. We call such families of processes branching processes with interactions. Our aim is to study their long-term behaviour under a specific regime of the pairwise interaction parameters that we introduce as the subcritical cooperative regime. Under such a regime, we prove that a process in this class comes down from infinity and has a moment dual which turns out to be a jump-diffusion that can be thought as the evolution of the frequency of a trait or phenotype, and whose parameters have a classical interpretation in terms of population genetics. The moment dual is an important tool for characterizing the stationary distribution of branching processes with interactions whenever such a distribution exists; it is also an interesting object in its own right.

Conditions for evolutionarily stable strategies

1980 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 559-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andris Abakuks
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

It is pointed out that the conditions given by Haigh (1975) for finding evolutionarily stable strategies corresponding to a given matrix are sufficient, but not always necessary. An example is given, and an amended version of the necessary and sufficient conditions is stated.

On Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Zhang ◽  
Yaqi Hao ◽  
Daizhan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

scholarly journals Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Peng He ◽  
Feifei Xu ◽  
Chunming (Victor) Shi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Tourism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Cost Advantage ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Green Tourism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

scholarly journals Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons

2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 259-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergiu Hart ◽  
Yosef Rinott ◽  
Benjamin Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Random Polygons ◽  
Random Games ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

Random evolutionarily stable strategies

1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Auslander ◽  
J. Guckenheimer ◽  
G. Oster
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable
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