Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test

Synthese ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Levi
Keyword(s):  
Erkenntnis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Crupi ◽  
Andrea Iacona

AbstractThis paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material accounts which hinge on the Ramsey Test, advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 215-232
Author(s):  
Scott Sturgeon

Consider the frameS believes that—.Fill it with a conditional, sayIf you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke.what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances ofS believes (A→C)?In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple.Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed either you believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment. This take on belief is coarse-grained. It says belief has three flavours: acceptance, rejection, neither. But it's not the only way common-sense thinks of belief. Sometimes it's more subtle: ‘How strong is your faith?’ can be apposite between believers. That signals an important fact. Ordinary practice also treats belief as a fine-grained affair. It speaks of levels of confidence. It admits degrees of belief. It contains a fine-grained take as well. There are two ways belief is seen in everyday life. One is coarse-grained. The other is fine-grained.


Studia Logica ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Pais ◽  
Peter Jackson

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Heyninck ◽  
Gabriele Kern-Isberner ◽  
Tjitze Rienstra ◽  
Kenneth Skiba ◽  
Matthias Thimm

For propositional beliefs, there are well-established connections between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference. In argumentative contexts, such connections have not yet been investigated. On the one hand, the exact relationship between formal argumentation and nonmonotonic inference relations is a research topic that keeps on eluding researchers despite recently intensified efforts, whereas argumentative revision has been studied in numerous works during recent years. In this paper, we show that similar relationships between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference hold in argumentative contexts as well. We first define revision operators for abstract dialectical frameworks, and use such revision operators to define dynamic conditionals by means of the Ramsey test. We show that such conditionals can be equivalently defined using a total preorder over three-valued interpretations, and study the inferential behaviour of the resulting conditional inference relations.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 84 (6) ◽  
pp. 1229-1262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Andreas ◽  
Mario Günther
Keyword(s):  

1992 ◽  
Vol 89 (10) ◽  
pp. 522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Ove Hansson
Keyword(s):  

1997 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Döring
Keyword(s):  

Inferensi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Hendri Prabowo ◽  
Suhartono Suhartono ◽  
Dedy Dwi Prastyo
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
R.A. Briggs

According to Adams’ thesis the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. According to Stalnaker semantics, a conditional is true at a world just in case its consequent is true at all closest antecedent worlds to the original world. The chapter argues that Adams’ thesis and Stalnaker semantics are ways of cashing out the same ‘Ramsey test’ idea. Unfortunately, a well-known class of triviality theorems shows that Adams’ thesis and Stalnaker semantics are incompatible. Stefan Kaufmann has proposed (for reasons largely independent of the triviality theorems) a revised version of Adams’ thesis, which the chapter calls Kaufmann’s thesis. The chapter proves that combining Kaufmann’s thesis with Stalnaker semantics leads to ‘local triviality’ results, which seem just as absurd as the original triviality results for Adams’ thesis.


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