Existence of equilibrium stationary strategies in discounted noncooperative stochastic games with uncountable state space

1985 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. S. Nowak
1980 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. A. M. Couwenbergh
Keyword(s):  

1976 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 245 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. J. Himmelberg ◽  
T. Parthasarathy ◽  
T. E. S. Raghavan ◽  
F. S. Van Vleck

2001 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 283-290
Author(s):  
J. FLESCH ◽  
F. THUIJSMAN ◽  
O. J. VRIEZE

We deal with zero-sum stochastic games. We demonstrate the importance of stationary strategies by showing that stationary strategies are better (in terms of the rewards they guarantee for a player, against any strategy of his opponent) than (1) pure strategies (even history-dependent ones), (2) strategies which may use only a finite number of different mixed actions in any state, and (3) strategies with finite recall. Examples are given to clarify the issues.


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