Conditional obligation, deontic paradoxes, and the logic of agency

1993 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bartha
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation ◽  
Logic Of Agency ◽  
Deontic Paradoxes

The Robbery Paradox

Dialogue ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-440
Author(s):  
Mark Vorobej
Keyword(s):  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Conditional Obligation ◽  
Proper Formulation ◽  
Deontic Paradoxes

James E. Tomberlin [6] has recently argued that the logical systems of conditional obligation proposed by Azizah al-Hibri [1] and Peter Mott [5] are incapable of resolving at least one variant of the notorious contrary to duty imperative paradox, formulated originally by Chisholm [2]. Tomberlin concedes that these systems offer the very best of the' “conditional obligation approach” to deontic logic and concludes his critical discussion with the pessimistic remark that “the best of this approach is simply not good enough. Deontic logic … is obliged to turn elsewhere for its proper formulation and resolution of the deontic paradoxes” ([6], 373). Below I argue that Tomberlin's three central arguments against al-Hibri and Mott are fallacious.

Conditional Obligation

1974 ◽  
pp. 23-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian F. Chellas
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

Deontic Paradox and Conditional Obligation

1989 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 107 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Tomberlin
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation

scholarly journals On the Axiomatisation of Elgesem's Logic of Agency and Ability

2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Governatori ◽  
Antonino Rotolo
Keyword(s):  
Logic Of Agency

scholarly journals A Kelsenian Deontic Logic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agata Ciabattoni ◽  
Xavier Parent ◽  
Giovanni Sartor
Keyword(s):  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Deontic Paradoxes

Inspired by Kelsen’s view that norms establish causal-like connections between facts and sanctions, we develop a deontic logic in which a proposition is obligatory iff its complement causes a violation. We provide a logic for normative causality, define non-contextual and contextual notions of illicit and duty, and show that the logic of such duties is well-behaved and solves the main deontic paradoxes.

scholarly journals Supererogation and conditional obligation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Muñoz ◽  
Theron Pummer
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation ◽  
General Account

AbstractThere are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.

Freedom and ReflectionHegel and the Logic of Agency

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Yeomans
Keyword(s):  
Logic Of Agency

On the Dynamic Logic of Agency and Action

Studia Logica ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chrysafis Hartonas
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Logic ◽  
Logic Of Agency

Chellas on conditional obligation

1983 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bonevac
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Obligation
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