The kernel of the sum of two cooperative games

1984 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
č. šimelis
Keyword(s):  
1999 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 10-14
Author(s):  
Vladislav I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
E. N. Opletayeva
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Bezalel Peleg ◽  
Peter Sudhölter
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 279 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Benati ◽  
Fernando López-Blázquez ◽  
Justo Puerto

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-134
Author(s):  
Konstantin Kudryavtsev ◽  
Ustav Malkov

AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.


Author(s):  
Niharika Kakoty ◽  
Parishmita Baruah ◽  
Surajit Borkotokey
Keyword(s):  

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