scholarly journals On a compromise social choice correspondence

Top ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-324
Author(s):  
Marieke Quant ◽  
Peter Borm ◽  
Hans Reijnierse ◽  
Mark Voorneveld
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Correspondence ◽  
Choice Correspondence

The stability set as a social choice correspondence

2002 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathieu Martin ◽  
Vincent Merlin
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Correspondence ◽  
Choice Correspondence ◽  
The Stability

scholarly journals Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Peters ◽  
Panos Protopapas
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Preference Relation ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Choice Correspondence ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Choice Correspondence ◽  
Infinite Set ◽  
Weak Axiom

Abstract We consider choice correspondences that assign a subset to every choice set of alternatives, where the total set of alternatives is an arbitrary finite or infinite set. We focus on the relations between several extensions of the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives on one hand, and conditions on the revealed preference relation on sets, notably the weak axiom of revealed preference, on the other hand. We also establish the connection between the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives and so-called strong sets; the latter characterize a social choice correspondence satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives.

scholarly journals Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Basteck
Keyword(s):  
Monotonicity Property ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
The Other ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Property A ◽  
Borda Rule ◽  
Scoring Rule ◽  
Direct Mechanism ◽  
Social Choice Correspondence ◽  
Choice Correspondence

AbstractWe characterize voting procedures according to the social choice correspondence they implement when voters cast ballots strategically, applying iteratively undominated strategies. In elections with three candidates, the Borda Rule is the unique positional scoring rule that satisfies unanimity (U) (i.e., elects a candidate whenever it is unanimously preferred) and is majoritarian after eliminating a worst candidate (MEW)(i.e., if there is a unanimously disliked candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected). In a larger class of rules, Approval Voting is characterized by a single axiom that implies both U and MEW but is weaker than Condorcet-consistency (CON)—it is the only direct mechanism scoring rule that is majoritarian after eliminating a Pareto-dominated candidate (MEPD)(i.e., if there is a Pareto-dominated candidate, the majority-preferred among the other two is elected); among all finite scoring rules that satisfy MEPD, Approval Voting is the most decisive. However, it fails a desirable monotonicity property: a candidate that is elected for some preference profile, may lose the election once she gains further in popularity. In contrast, the Borda Rule is the unique direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies U, MEW and monotonicity (MON). There exists no direct mechanism scoring rule that satisfies both MEPD and MON and no finite scoring rule satisfying CON.

Cycles and Social Choice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice

Professor Johnson on Social Choice

2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 518-522
Author(s):  
Mohammed H. I. Dore
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice
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