Bilateral investment treaties as deterrents of host-country discretion: the impact of investor-state disputes on foreign direct investment in developing countries

2017 ◽  
Vol 154 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Aisbett ◽  
Matthias Busse ◽  
Peter Nunnenkamp
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
The Impact

Economic Policy Uncertainty, Bilateral Investment Treaties, and Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment

2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-557
Author(s):  
Yue Lu ◽  
Linghui Wu ◽  
Ka Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Policy Uncertainty ◽  
Outward Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Economic Policy Uncertainty ◽  
Chinese Investment ◽  
Investment Treaties

This paper examines the effect of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in promoting Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI) in the presence of rising economic policy uncertainty in China's partner countries. We postulate that the signing of BITs should help stimulate COFDI because the treaties send a credible signal to foreign investors about the host country's intent to protect Chinese investment, and make it more difficult for the host country to violate its treaty obligations. BITs that contain rigorous investment protection and liberalization provisions, in particular, should be more likely to encourage COFDI as they directly influence Chinese investors' expectations about the stability, predictability, and security of the host market. However, while BITs generally promote COFDI, host country economic policy uncertainty may also limit their effectiveness. This is because uncertainty tends to undermine investor confidence, trigger capital flows from high- to low-risk countries, and dampen commercial activities. Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation models of the determinants of COFDI to 188 countries between 2003 and 2017 lend substantial support to our conjectures.

scholarly journals Natural Resources, Property Rights, and the Domestic Logic of BIT Signing

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence K. Teo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaties

In contrast to the substantial scholarship on whether bilateral investment treaties (BITs) increase foreign direct investment (FDI), there is less work on what drives governments to sign these treaties in the first place. I develop a theory of treaty signing that emphasizes the domestic factors that motivate a government to sign BITs. Using a panel dataset of developing countries from 1960 to 2010, I find that governments scarce in natural resources are more likely to sign BITs compared to their richer counterparts. In addition, governments with middle levels of property rights are more likely to sign BITs compared to those with low or high levels. Finally, the most likely BIT signers are resource-scarce countries with middle levels of property rights. That strategic dynamics exist in BIT signing has implications for assessing the effects of these treaties in other issue areas such as trade, human rights, and the environment.

Sicherung privater Investitionen – ein geeignetes Instrument der Entwicklungshilfe?

2008 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Egger ◽  
Andreas Freytag ◽  
Sebastian Voll ◽  
Philipp Harms
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Bilateral Investment Treaties ◽  
Investment Treaties ◽  
The Impact

AbstractPeter Egger’s paper provides a synthesis of findings with regard to the impact of bilateral as well as multilateral means of protection of cross-border direct investments in less developed countries and, in turn, on their economic growth. In particular, he focuses on the role of bilateral investment treaties and multilateral agreements such as the GATS in this regard. Previous empirical work identifies a significant positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. It suggests a similar impact of the GATS on FDI. He argues that these agreements contribute significantly to economic growth in less developed economies and countries in transition by spurring technology transfers through multinational activity of the developed countries in other economiesAndreas Freytag and Sebastian Voll emphasize the important role of adequate institutions both for investment and development. The question is, whether investment guarantees as insurance for political risks in the recipient country support economic development or not. Actually, the German Federal Republic is the leading warrantor for FDI-insurances on the world, but the benefiting countries are not the LDC’s. Using these warranties as an instrument of development policy in the future is content of actual political discussion. They argue that, in case of economies with weak domestic institutions, investment guarantees could provide disincentives for politicians in the target country to establish rule of law and good governance. On the other hand, investment guarantees could foster development by providing additional access to FDI, especially in emerging market economies with sufficient and improving institutional qualityPhilipp Harms points out while foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries and emerging markets have increased substantially in recent years, many low-income countries are still shunned by multinational firms. One of the key causes for this observation is the poor quality of institutions and an often precarious political environment in these countries. Given the benefits of FDI for host country productivity and income levels, it could thus be argued that protecting the security of property rights is an effective way of enhancing growth and prosperity in poor countries. While he agrees with this point of view, he argues that “traditional” forms of development aid can substantially contribute to an improved investment climate in developing countries. This argument is based on the notion that insecure property rights reflect distributional conflicts in the host country population, and that appropriate development support can shift agents’ distributional interests in favor of foreign firms.

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