scholarly journals Fiscal risk sharing and redistribution between Austrian states

Empirica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukas Reiss
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (181) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Batini ◽  
Francesco Lamperti ◽  
Andrea Roventini

The COVID-19 lockdowns have brought about the need of large fiscal responses in all European countries. However, countries across Europe are differently equipped to respond to the shock due to differences in economic conditions and fiscal space. We build on the model by Berger et al. (2019) to compare gains from alternative mechanisms of EU fiscal integration in the presence of moral hazard. We show that any EU response strategy to the COVID-19 crisis excluding mutual financial support to member countries lacks credibility. Some form of fiscal risk sharing is indeed better than none, especially in presence of increasing sovereign default risk of some EU member countries. The moral hazard created by risk sharing can be hedged by introducing some form of fiscal delegation to Brussels. The desirable level of delegation, however, depends on its costs. When these are low, risk sharing and delegation are substitutes and it is optimal to opt for high delegation and low risk sharing. On the contrary, when delegation costs are high, centralization and risk sharing are complements and both are needed. Proposed arrangements at the EU level in response to the COVID-19 shock seem to reflect these basic insights by rotating around a combination of fiscal risk sharing and delegation in the form of fiscal spending conditionality.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (198) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Furceri ◽  
Aleksandra Zdzienicka ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Kerstin Bernoth ◽  
Philipp Engler
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Furceri ◽  
Aleksandra Zdzienicka
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucio Baccaro ◽  
Björn Bremer ◽  
Erik Neimanns

Existing research suggests that a “democratic constraint” blocks progress towards debt mutualization in the eurozone: voters in creditor countries fiercely oppose debt sharing, while voters in debtor countries strongly support remaining in the euro, which limits their governments’ bargaining power. However, this literature neglects that preferences depend on expectations about what other countries will do. We document this strategic interdependence with a novel survey experiment in Germany and Italy, conducted at a crucial moment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Italian voters vastly discount the costs of a disorderly exit, while they strongly reduce their support for the euro if austerity is a condition for continued euro membership. Faced with the possibility of Italexit, German voters weigh the costs of a possible breakup of the euro more heavily than the costs of debt mutualization. A majority thus accepts debt mutualization. These results suggest that voters take strategic interdependence into account when formulating their preferences and that public opinion is not (or no longer) a binding constrain for increasing fiscal risk-sharing in the eurozone. Moreover, we reconstruct the debate about the pandemic recovery fund in Germany and Italy and show that the German change of position was aimed at defusing a threat to the integrity of the eurozone.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Furceri ◽  
Aleksandra Zdzienicka
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne Laban
Keyword(s):  

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