Information economics can be best described as a shift in the traditional neoclassical assumption of perfect information. Neoclassical economics assumes that all actors have access to perfect information and are rational in their behavior. Over the years, as scholars have realized that the assumptions of neoclassical economics are not an accurate reflection of the real world, other research streams have developed that relax these assumptions. Information economics is one such stream, arguing that actors or parties have differential access to information, which raises the concern of adverse selection and moral hazard when the actors or parties participate in a transaction. Adverse selection occurs when one party has more information about the product or service than the other party and it leads to a less profitable or riskier transaction for the uninformed party. Alternatively, moral hazard occurs after the transaction, where one party has an incentive to engage in risky behavior when the other party bears the cost of failure. Information economics offers insights to both these concerns and offers solutions in the form of signaling and protection mechanisms. Signaling theory, a component of information economics, addresses how one party can credibly convey information to its potential exchange partners to facilitate transactions. The concepts of information asymmetry and signaling have been widely used in economics and business research to understand concepts ranging from game theoretic models of investments to principal–agent relationships to adverse selection problems in transactions. Information economics offers strong foundations for research within management as it helps understand several phenomena related to organizational transactions. For instance, corporate strategy scholars have utilized the predictions stemming from information economics in acquisition research to study target search, selection, signaling behavior, acquisition contracting, premiums, and governance. Information economics also has broad potential to affect firms’ organizational governance and entry mode choices. The following paragraphs will discuss how this theory has been developed and provide a few applications of information economics in strategy and management research.