The Euro Area Crisis: Need for a Supranational Fiscal Risk Sharing Mechanism?

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Furceri ◽  
Aleksandra Zdzienicka
Keyword(s):  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (198) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Furceri ◽  
Aleksandra Zdzienicka ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davide Furceri ◽  
Aleksandra Zdzienicka
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (s1) ◽  
pp. 73-97
Author(s):  
Daniel Daianu

This paper argues that there are conditions for successful euro area (EA) accession, apart from fiscal rectitude. One is an ex ante critical mass of real convergence which should enhance lasting nominal convergence. Another condition is an overhaul of EA mechanisms and policies that should make it a properly functioning monetary union, which implies an adequate mix between risk-reduction and risk-sharing. It is argued that risk-sharing cannot be secured by private sector arrangements only. Entering the ERM2 is deemed to be no less demanding than euro area accession per se, especially for countries that use fl exible exchange rate regimes. The paper examines also the infl uence of production (value) chains on the efficacy of autonomous monetary and exchange rate policies when it comes to controlling external imbalances; macro-prudential policies, too, are highlighted in this regard. Steady productivity gains are a must for surmounting the middle income trap and achieving sustainable real convergence.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Fracasso

Abstract The recent debate on the reform of the economic governance in the euro area has been marred by a stark disagreement on the correct sequence between risk-reduction (responsibility) and risk-sharing (solidarity). In fact, the dichotomy between risk-reduction and risk-sharing may be fallacious as they reinforce each other, particularly in a monetary union with no lender of last resort for the public sector and no common macroeconomic stabilization mechanisms. The lack of risk-sharing mechanisms is per se a major source of redenomination and default risks and thus it makes the euro area prone to financial market segmentation along national borders and ultimately weaker. At the same time, greater structural convergence has to be achieved through structural reforms and fiscal prudence in order to reduce the likelihood of future negative idiosyncratic shocks in currently vulnerable countries. Notwithstanding some progress towards a politically viable solution encompassing both responsibility and solidarity, a number of important issues remain controversial. This short article summarizes the debate and introduces some of these controversial issues, ranging from the correct role of market discipline when markets are prone to self-fulfilling prophecies and multiple equilibria, to the (dis)advantages of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms based on rules rather than discretion, from the pros and cons of new safe assets in the euro area to the primacy of coping with debt legacy problems, and the like.


2018 ◽  
pp. 124-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrizio Balassone ◽  
Sara Cecchetti ◽  
Martina Cecioni ◽  
Marika Cioffi ◽  
Wanda Cornacchia ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (181) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicoletta Batini ◽  
Francesco Lamperti ◽  
Andrea Roventini

The COVID-19 lockdowns have brought about the need of large fiscal responses in all European countries. However, countries across Europe are differently equipped to respond to the shock due to differences in economic conditions and fiscal space. We build on the model by Berger et al. (2019) to compare gains from alternative mechanisms of EU fiscal integration in the presence of moral hazard. We show that any EU response strategy to the COVID-19 crisis excluding mutual financial support to member countries lacks credibility. Some form of fiscal risk sharing is indeed better than none, especially in presence of increasing sovereign default risk of some EU member countries. The moral hazard created by risk sharing can be hedged by introducing some form of fiscal delegation to Brussels. The desirable level of delegation, however, depends on its costs. When these are low, risk sharing and delegation are substitutes and it is optimal to opt for high delegation and low risk sharing. On the contrary, when delegation costs are high, centralization and risk sharing are complements and both are needed. Proposed arrangements at the EU level in response to the COVID-19 shock seem to reflect these basic insights by rotating around a combination of fiscal risk sharing and delegation in the form of fiscal spending conditionality.


Significance The programme expands existing purchases of asset-backed securities and covered bonds with large-scale buying of bonds issued by euro-area governments, agencies and European institutions. Purchases will amount to a combined total of 60 billion euros (69 billion dollars) per month, starting in March. They will continue until at least September 2016 -- or until there is progress towards the central bank's medium-term inflation goal. Impacts The larger than expected size of the programme will be achievable thanks to partial risk sharing among national central banks. Wealth effects will be smaller than in the United States and United Kingdom, as euro-area capital markets are less deep. The QE programme will amount to 12% of euro-area GDP, while the US programme was larger, at 25% of GDP.


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