Competing for Happiness: Attitudes to Competition, Positional Concerns and Wellbeing

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (7) ◽  
pp. 1981-2008
Author(s):  
Mara Grasseni ◽  
Federica Origo
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 799-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salima Salhi ◽  
Gilles Grolleau ◽  
Naoufel Mzoughi ◽  
Angela Sutan
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 1934-1952 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirill Borissov

We consider a model of economic growth with altruistic agents who care about their consumption and the disposable income of their offspring. The agents' consumption and the offspring's disposable income are subject to positional concerns. We show that, if the measure of consumption-related positional concerns is sufficiently low and/or the measure of offspring-related positional concerns is sufficiently high, then there is a unique steady-state equilibrium, which is characterized by perfect income and wealth equality, and all intertemporal equilibira converge to it. Otherwise, in steady-state equilibria, the population splits into two classes, the rich and the poor; under this scenario, in any intertemporal equilibrium, all capital is eventually owned by the households that were the wealthiest from the outset and all other households become poor.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elina Lampi ◽  
Katarina Nordblom
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 183-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Latifa Barbara ◽  
Gilles Grolleau ◽  
Assia Houfaf Khoufaf ◽  
Youcef Meriane ◽  
Naoufel Mzoughi

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-399
Author(s):  
Salvador Contreras

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study how positional concerns influence a parent’s time investment decisions of her/his child. Design/methodology/approach The author presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of household positional and non-positional time investment choices in the education of her/his child. Findings The author shows that a parent who is mindful of her/his relative position in the income distribution will use her/his time investment choices to influence her/his perceived status. The theoretical model predicts that visible time investment increases as members of her/his reference group move up in rank. The author shows that moving down in rank lowers utility. The author employs National Education Longitudinal Studies (1988) data set to test the model prediction and shows that visible time invested in child’s education is explained by place on the income distribution. Originality/value The author extends the positional literature to account for parent time investment in her/his child’s education. The work suggests that time investment in one’s child’s education is based on more than altruistic preferences and resources. It leaves open the possibility that perceived social standing influences a household’s time investment in their child’s education. From a policy perspective, the findings provide a new way to think about drivers of parental involvement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 129 ◽  
pp. 103547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Armenak Antinyan ◽  
Gergely Horváth ◽  
Mofei Jia

1998 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara J. Solnick ◽  
David Hemenway
Keyword(s):  

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