Finding the Strong Nash Equilibrium: Computation, Existence and Characterization for Markov Games

2020 ◽  
Vol 186 (3) ◽  
pp. 1029-1052
Author(s):  
Julio B. Clempner ◽  
Alexander S. Poznyak
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Markov Games ◽  
Equilibrium Computation ◽  
Strong Nash Equilibrium

Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvika Neeman ◽  
Nir Vulkan
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Exchange Mechanism ◽  
Future Period ◽  
Strong Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Heterogenous Group ◽  
Informed Traders ◽  
Decentralized Bargaining

The paper considers the consequences of competition between two widely used exchange mechanisms, a “decentralized bargaining'' market, and a “centralized'' market. In every period, members of a large heterogenous group of privately-informed traders who each wish to buy or sell one unit of some homogenous good may opt for trading through one exchange mechanism. Traders may also postpone their trade to a future period. It is shown that trade outside the centralized market completely unravels. In every strong Nash equilibrium, all trade takes place in the centralized market. No trade ever occurs through direct negotiations.

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