scholarly journals Group epistemic value

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Dunn
Keyword(s):  
Peer Review ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
School Curriculum ◽  
Social World ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Aggregate Level ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Epistemic Perspective ◽  
Oxford University Press

AbstractSometimes we are interested in how groups are doing epistemically in aggregate. For instance, we may want to know the epistemic impact of a change in school curriculum or the epistemic impact of abolishing peer review in the sciences. Being able to say something about how groups are doing epistemically is especially important if one is interested in pursuing a consequentialist approach to social epistemology of the sort championed by Goldman (Knowledge in a social world. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999). According to this approach we evaluate social practices and institutions from an epistemic perspective based on how well they promote the aggregate level of epistemic value across a community. The aim of this paper is to investigate this concept of group epistemic value and defend a particular way of measuring it.

Book reviews: The wonderful geometry of dynamics

1996 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-255 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Gravitational Field ◽  
School Curriculum ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
British School ◽  
Readable Form ◽  
The Common ◽  
S Chandrasekhar ◽  
Oxford University Press

S. Chandrasekhar, Newton's Principia for the Common Reader : Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN 0-19-851744-0 Copies of Cajori’s translation of Newton’s Principia and of Whiston’s Sir Isaac Newtons Mathematick Philosophy More Easily Demonstrated (Senex & Taylor, 1716) have rested on my shelves for some years. Nevertheless, I had only dipped into them to compare Mach’s criticisms with Newton’s discussions of the fundamentals, and to read his proofs of some of the crucial theorems, such as: ‘there is no gravitational field anywhere inside a gravitating shell of uniform matter bounded by two similar concentric ellipsoids’. Reading Chandrasekhar’s book has introduced me to much more of Newton’s masterpiece. Chandrasekhar’s novel approach to understanding Principia is to set himself to prove the major propositions by modem methods, and then to follow Newton’s proofs. He succeeds in putting Newton’s propositions into a far more readable form, and in comparing the relative dullness of the more modem, manipulative methods with the greater insight generated by geometry. Some years ago, after much debate, geometry as known to Euclid was dropped from the British school curriculum.

scholarly journals Epistemic Value Theory and Social Epistemology

Episteme ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fallis
Keyword(s):  
Social Epistemology ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Social World ◽  
Value Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Alvin Goldman ◽  
Real People ◽  
Epistemic Value Theory ◽  
Better Than

ABSTRACTIn order to guide the decisions of real people who want to bring about good epistemic outcomes for themselves and others, we need to understand our epistemic values. In Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman has proposed an epistemic value theory that allows us to say whether one outcome is epistemically better than another. However, it has been suggested that Goldman's theory is not really an epistemic value theory at all because whether one outcome is epistemically better than another partly depends on our non-epistemic interests. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic value theory that serves the purposes of social epistemology must incorporate non-epistemic interests in much the way that Goldman's theory does. In fact, I argue that Goldman's theory does not go far enough in this direction. In particular, the epistemic value of having a particular true belief should actually be weighted by how interested we are in the topic.

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