scholarly journals Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn ◽  
Julien Dutant
Keyword(s):  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Perceptual Error

AbstractWordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account of rationality and reasons for belief. We argue that worldly internalism faces serious difficulties and that its apparent advantages are illusory. First, it cannot adequately handle some not terribly strange cases of perceptual error. Second, it cannot explain why one should plan to use their evidence to update their beliefs. The second issue allows us to explain why cases of misplaced certainty do not require us to introduce false evidence into our views and that why the alleged advantage of worldly internalism in resisting sceptical pressures is illusory.

Direct Realism and Illusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Perceptual Representation ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Standard Response ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Ambiguous Stimuli ◽  
Physical Objects ◽  
Apparent Problem

The supposed problem of perceptual error, including illusion and hallucination, has led most theories of perception to deny formulations of direct realism. The standard response to this apparent problem adopts the mistaken presupposition that perception is indeed liable to error. However, the prevailing conditions of observation are themselves elements of perceptual representation, functioning in the manner of predicate modifiers. They ensure that the predicates applied in perceptual representations do indeed correctly attribute properties that perceived physical objects actually instantiate. Thus, perceptual representations are immune to misrepresentation of the sort misguidedly supposed by the spurious problem of perceptual misrepresentation. Granted the possibility that perceptual attribution admits of predicate modification, it is quite possible that perceptual experience permits both rudimentary and sophisticated conceptualization. Moreover, such treatment of perceptual predication rewards by providing an account of aspect alteration exemplified by perception of ambiguous stimuli.

Empiricism and Normative Constraint

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah Ginsborg
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Intentional Content ◽  
Empirical Reality ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Empirical World ◽  
Normative Constraint ◽  
Normative Relation

McDowell holds that our thinking, in order to have intentional content, must stand in a normative relation to empirical reality. He thinks that this condition can be satisfied only if we adopt “minimal empiricism”: the view that beliefs and judgements stand in rational relations to perceptual experiences, conceived as passive. I raise two complementary difficulties for minimal empiricism, one challenging McDowell’s view that experiences, conceived as passive, can be reasons for belief, the other challenging his view of experience as presupposing conceptual capacities. I go on to argue that minimal empiricism is not necessary for satisfying the condition that thinking be normatively related to the empirical world. There is another way of understanding the relation between thought and reality which construes it as normative without being rational: we can understand it as the world’s normative constraint on the activity through which empirical concepts, and hence empirical thinking, become possible.

scholarly journals Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Conclusive Evidence ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Plausible Assumption ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Normative Force ◽  
Epistemic Trust ◽  
Conceptual Connection ◽  
Epistemic Blame

AbstractThe normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.

scholarly journals JPEG Quality Transcoding Using Neural Networks Trained with a Perceptual Error Measure

1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Lazzaro ◽  
John Wawrzynek
Keyword(s):  
Prototype System ◽  
Training Procedure ◽  
Human Visual Perception ◽  
Error Measure ◽  
Jpeg Image ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Image File ◽  
Visual Artifacts ◽  
Error Metric ◽  
Coded Images

A JPEG Quality Transcoder (JQT) converts a JPEG image file that was encoded with low image quality to a larger JPEG image file with reduced visual artifacts, without access to the original uncompressed image. In this article, we describe technology for JQT design that takes a pattern recognition approach to the problem, using a database of images to train statistical models of the artifacts introduced through JPEG compression. In the training procedure for these models, we use a model of human visual perception as an error measure. Our current prototype system removes 32.2% of the artifacts introduced by moderate compression, as measured on an independent test database of linearly coded images using a perceptual error metric. This improvement results in an average PSNR reduction of 0.634 dB.

Practical Steps and Reasons for Action

1997 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Clark
Keyword(s):  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
The Real ◽  
General Characterization ◽  
Practical Inference

There is an idea, going back to Aristotle, that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief. Not surprisingly, the idea has almost always led to some form of inferentialism about reasons for action. In this paper I argue that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief, but that this requires abandoning inferentialism about reasons for action. This result will be thought paradoxical. It is generally assumed that if there is to be a useful parallel, there must be some such thing as a practical inference. As we shall see, that assumption tends to block the fruitful exploration of the real parallel. On the view I shall defend, the practical analogue of an ordinary inference is not an inference, but something I shall call a practical step. Nevertheless, the practical step will do, for a theory of reasons for action, what ordinary inference does for an inferentialist theory of reasons for belief. The result is a general characterization of reasons, practical and theoretical, in terms of the correctness conditions of the relevant sorts of step.

Minnesota Percepto-Diagnostic Test and Reading Achievement

1981 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lillian R. Putnam
Keyword(s):  
Reading Achievement ◽  
Brain Damage ◽  
Diagnostic Test ◽  
Group Analysis ◽  
Perceptual Error ◽  
Reading Mastery ◽  
Remedial Readers ◽  
Damage Indicators ◽  
Mastery Tests

With mental ages partialled out, the correlation of −0.25 between perceptual error scores of 102 remedial readers on the Minnesota Percepto-Diagnostic Test and Woodcock Reading Mastery Tests was not significant. Intra-group analysis of scores on reproductions showed that those in the organic classification made significantly more errors on the horizontal arrow figure. Inter-group analysis indicated significant differences among primary, secondary, and organic classifications with the organic producing the most errors on the horizontal arrow figure. Inter-group analysis of brain-damage indicators yielded no significant differences; inter-group analysis showed that those assigned the organic classifications made significantly more errors in distortion of dots.

scholarly journals Mitigating Perceptual Error in Synthetic Animatronics using Visual Feature Flow

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (10) ◽  
pp. 331
Author(s):  
Ryan Schubert ◽  
Gerd Bruder ◽  
Greg Welch
Keyword(s):  
Visual Feature ◽  
Perceptual Error
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