Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn (Eds.), 2018, Epistemic Consequentialism

Wrong Action

Pettigrew focuses on trade-off objections to epistemic consequentialism. Such objections are similar to familiar objections from ethics where an intuitively wrong action (e.g., killing a healthy patient) leads to a net gain in value (e.g., saving five other patients). The objection to the epistemic consequentialist concerns cases where adopting an intuitively wrong belief leads to a net gain in epistemic value. Pettigrew defends the epistemic consequentialist against such objections by accepting that the unintuitive verdicts of consequentialism are unintuitive, but offering an error theory for why these intuitions do not show the view to be false.

Epistemic Teleology

10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0005 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Ralph Wedgwood

Keyword(s):

Belief State ◽

The Difference ◽

Belief States ◽

Epistemic Teleology

Wedgwood focuses his discussion around two evaluative concepts: correctness and rationality. Wedgwood proposes that these two concepts are related in the following way: one belief state is more rational than another if and only if the first has less expected inaccuracy than the former. He argues, however, that this view should not be understood as a form of consequentialism since it is not the total consequences of a belief state that determine its rationality. The view is rather a version of epistemic teleology. Wedgwood deploys this view to illuminate the difference between synchronic and diachronic evaluation of belief states as well as to disarm objections that have been leveled against epistemic consequentialism.

Demoting promoting objections to epistemic consequentialism

Philosophical Issues ◽

10.1111/phis.12153 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 29 (1) ◽

pp. 268-280

Author(s):

Daniel J. Singer

Keyword(s):

The Truth Fairy and the Indirect Epistemic Consequentialist

Epistemic Entitlement ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198713524.003.0013 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 344-360

Author(s):

Daniel Y. Elstein ◽

C.S.I. Jenkins

Keyword(s):

Epistemic Rationality ◽

Epistemic Value ◽

Friends of Wright-entitlement cannot appeal to direct epistemic consequentialism (believe or accept what maximizes expected epistemic value) in order to account for the epistemic rationality of accepting Wright-entitled propositions. The tenability of direct consequentialism is undermined by the “Truth Fairy”: a powerful being who offers you great epistemic reward (in terms of true beliefs) if you accept a proposition p for which you have evidence neither for nor against. However, this chapter argues that a form of indirect epistemic consequentialism seems promising as a way to deal with the Truth Fairy problem. The relevant form of indirect consequentialism accommodates evidentialism but allows for exceptions in the case of anti-sceptical hypotheses. Since these are the kind of propositions to which Wright-entitlement is supposed to apply—i.e. cornerstone propositions—indirect consequentialism is entitlement-friendly.

Conclusion

Morality and Epistemic Judgement ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198842736.003.0011 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 213-218

Author(s):

Christopher Cowie

Keyword(s):

Error Theory ◽

Reasons For Action ◽

Reasons For Belief ◽

Moral Error Theory ◽

Moral Error ◽

Argument From Analogy ◽

Moral Properties ◽

Categorical Reasons

The views outlined in earlier chapters are systematically presented. These include: the truth of epistemic institutionalism and falsity of analogous institutionalist views in morality; the challenges facing categorical reasons for action that do not apply to categorial reasons for belief; the reducible nature of epistemic properties and relations—including the defensibility of this view in light of concerns with the normativity of probability and the falsity of both veritism and epistemic consequentialism—in contrast to the irreducible nature of moral properties and relations, and the possibility of ‘the puzzling combination’. It is concluded that the argument from analogy fails and that the moral error theory may yet be true, but that it would be illegitimate to conclude that it is true.

RELIABILISM, VERITISM, AND EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM

Episteme ◽

10.1017/epi.2015.25 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 131-143 ◽

Cited By ~ 18

Author(s):

Alvin I. Goldman

Keyword(s):

Process Reliabilism ◽

Contemporary Epistemology

ABSTRACTAccording to Selim Berker the prevalence of consequentialism in contemporary epistemology rivals its prevalence in contemporary ethics. Similarly, and more to the point, Berker finds epistemic consequentialism, epitomized by process reliabilism, to be as misguided and problematic as ethical consequentialism. This paper shows how Berker misconstrues process reliabilism and fails to pinpoint any new or substantial defects in it.

Epistemic Consequentialism

The Philosophical Review ◽

10.1215/00318108-8311473 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 129 (3) ◽

pp. 484-489

Author(s):

Kevin Dorst

Keyword(s):

The Right in the Good

10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0002 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Clayton Littlejohn

Keyword(s):

Value Theory ◽

The Right

Littlejohn considers and criticizes the value theory that underlies epistemic consequentialism. He first casts doubt on veritism, the view according to which accuracy and only accuracy is the final epistemic good. One might think that the consequentialist is unscathed by this: simply put in something else as the epistemic good. But Littlejohn argues that this fails, too. For whatever it is that the consequentialist says is the epistemic good, she cannot make sense of why such a good should be promoted.

An Epistemic Defense of News Abstinence

The Epistemology of Fake News ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0014 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 286-309

Author(s):

Sven Bernecker

Keyword(s):

Fake News ◽

False Beliefs ◽

If we have reason to believe that by following the news, we acquire more false beliefs than true ones or we acquire true but irrelevant beliefs, then we may be justified in taking a newsbreak. We are propositionally justified in temporarily ignoring the news either in a domain or from a source if (i) we are in a fake news environment or are justified in believing that we are, and (ii) it is cognitively difficult or time consuming to discriminate genuine from fake news or to obtain genuine news. The defense of news abstinence rests either on reliabilism about justification or the defeasibility theory. When reliabilism is combined with epistemic consequentialism, news abstinence in a fake news environment is not only epistemically permitted but also epistemically required.

A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism

The Philosophical Quarterly ◽

10.1093/pq/pqu034 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 64 (257) ◽

pp. 541-551 ◽

Cited By ~ 31

Author(s):

K. Ahlstrom-Vij ◽

J. Dunn

Keyword(s):