Introduction

The introduction sets the scene for the book by outlining the key questions to be investigated. Are we free? Are we morally responsible for what we do? What is it that we deserve? When is it right to blame someone for a morally wrong action? It introduces basic key terms within the debate regarding freedom and moral responsibility, such as ‘determinism’, ‘compatibilism’, and ‘incompatibilism’, and then outlines the structure of argument for the central claim of the book, namely that there is no truth regarding whether or not determinism is compatible with freedom and moral responsibility. There is only a truth relative to some context of utterance.

Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility

I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a person may be blameworthy for an action that she did not know was wrong. The third challenge invokes the quality of will view. On this view, a person is blameworthy for a wrong action just in case the action manifests a bad quality of will. The blameworthy person need not satisfy an additional epistemic condition. I will argue that contrary to appearances, none of these challenges succeeds. Hence, moral responsibility does require a non-superfluous epistemic condition.

Two Conceptions of Moral Realism

This paper considers the comparative merits of two conceptions of real properties, as applied to the moral domain. On the weaker conception, real properties or facts are there anyway, independent of any experience. On the stronger conception, real properties are those not constituted by the availability of some response to them. The question is whether moral realists should restrict themselves to the weaker conception, allowing that a wrong action is one that is such as to elicit blame but not holding that this could constitute wrongness in the object. This paper argues that the weaker conception is inconsistent with the main argument for moral realism, which the author takes to appeal to the phenomenology of moral deliberation.

Pandora's Dreams

Should we be held accountable for what we imagine, but choose not to actually do? Does wrong thought always lead to wrong action? In this work of philosophical short story fiction, scientists have discovered a way to record dreams and make them available for playback. This quickly gives rise to the bootleg sale of horrible and wonderful dreams to a general public interested in ever-more spectacle. It also creates a market for buying and watching the dreams of celebrities. Finally, it brings about the government subpoenaing dreams to use as evidence in trials and, later, in helping it discover crimes that have not, but might, happen in the future.

Issues of the Preservation and Conservation of the Petroglyph in the Khoid Tsenkher Cave

The Khoid Tsenkher Cave is located 28 km away from the center of Mankhan soum, Khovd province in Mongolia. The cave contains about 40,000-year-old petroglyphs. A variety of animals were depicted on the surface of the rocks, such as ostriches, camels, lions, elephants, and buffaloes in red and light brown paints. These images prove the existence of the animals that became extinct a long time ago. These petroglyphs play an important role in the research of the history and culture of the Paleolithic period of the world due to its visual content and design methods. Unfortunately, 64 images and symbols were faded and became unknown due to the wrong action of the people and new carvings have been created on them. The cave is visited by about 5,000 international and domestic tourists a year, but they cannot actually see the main attraction and do not have the chance to understand its great value. Therefore, there is an opportunity to develop tourism by involving local people in the preservation and conservation process of the cave and its historical and cultural monuments.

Dasar-Dasar Pemberian Punishment

Punishment is a way of giving a warning to students at school by educators due to improper students' behavior so that their attitudes can change into correct and expected general norms. The purpose of this study was to find out the basics of giving punishment applied by educators. The method used was qualitative library research. Primary data sources were prioritized related to the punishment theories, then complemented by secondary sources related to the punishment problem. The results showed that the basics of giving punishment must be done to students who behave wrongly, don't overdo, the form of punishment has a relationship with miss-behavior, give punishment based on the wrong action committed, it must be consistent with the rules, be calm and objective, and before giving punishment, students should first be given a warning.

Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation

This chapter develops and defends the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: An action is supererogatory iff it is overall virtuous and either (1) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious, or (2) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious. This account is non-ad-hoc insofar as it is based on virtue ethical accounts of right and wrong action that are motivated from within the tradition, and thus fully deserving of the label “neo-Aristotelian.” And it is intuitively defensible: it correctly identifies both heroic and saintly actions as supererogatory and gives a plausible explanation of their status as supererogatory. It also correctly identifies those instances of more mundane supererogation as supererogation and explains their status as supererogatory.

The The Role of Teachers in the Character Building of Students at Karitas Watuneso High School

The role of the teacher in shaping the character of students is one important component in shaping the character of students to become better. Based on the results of research carried out at Karitas Watuneso high school that in shaping the character of students the teacher provides motivation, advice, guidance, and becomes an example for students who should be encouraged and replicated by the students participants. The type of motivation that teachers do at Karitas Watuneso high school is by providing scholarships for students, the type of guidance provided by teachers at Karitas Watuneso high school is implemented during the learning process and when other spiritual or extra-curricular activities are carried out, the role of the teacher in shape the character of students by giving advice to students, namely face to face with students specifically in one particular room, in addition to forming the character of participants in high school Karitas Watuneso teacher is an example thas is used as an example by students relating to attitudes, appearance, time discipline, as well as courtesy in speaking and mutual respect both teacher-teacher and teacher with students. The application of character that has been carried out at Karitas Watuneso senior high school is to provide stimulus for students before learning begins consisting of praying before starting learning and after learning, tidying the tables and chairs before learning begins, reminding students of the material being taught, and providing motivation for students related to the material to be taught. The purpose of providing motivation, guidance, advice, and being an example for students is that students know every wrong action that has been done by students and students are motivated to think creatively, learn independently, honestly, be responsible, discipline time, and neatly married school and have good manners.

Blame and Moral Ignorance

This chapter argues against the popular view that acting in accordance with one’s principles excuses moral wrongdoing. That is, if one is ignorant of the moral truth, and that ignorance explains one’s wrong actions in the right way, one shouldn’t be blamed for doing the wrong thing. One objection I raise is that there is no good way to make sense of the notion of the ignorance explaining the action in the right way. Another, linking back to the discussion of moral motivation, is that it is rare for moral ignorance to lead to wrong action in the absence of some other blameworthy moral failing. But the chapter ends on a concessive note; there are some rare cases where a false moral belief could excuse certain wrong actions.