A Dynamic Bargaining Game with Externalities

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 1591-1602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xianjia Wang ◽  
Jia Liu
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 124-162
Author(s):  
Vincent Anesi ◽  
T. Renee Bowen

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than are the constraints on redistribution themselves. (JEL D72, C78, H23, D78, D71)


2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 1029-1046
Author(s):  
Cheng-Lin Jin ◽  
De-Yuan Zhang ◽  
Ting Chen ◽  
Ke-Bin Lu

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 4721-4730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu An ◽  
Jie Duan ◽  
Mo-Yuen Chow ◽  
Alexandra Duel-Hallen

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