A transformative change through a coordination process and a steering agency. The case of the financial information system of the French central state

Recent scholarship has focused on how coordination mechanisms are implemented by public sector organizations, thereby paying attention to coordination as a process. This article studies the coordination process that resulted in the implementation of the interministerial financial information system of the French central state—named Chorus. Chorus is a case of an unlikely coordination process rolled out in the non-conducive context of the French Napoleonic Administration. Chorus aimed at connecting all ministries’ administrative services to a shared information system, while ministries were previously using their own systems and applications. Based on the literature on mechanisms of coordination, and focusing on the role of existing institutions and the actors involved in the coordination process, the analysis has two main results. First, AIFE—“Agence pour l’informatique financière de l’État”, the agency in charge of the implementation of Chorus—steered the process by developing a stepwise network-based interministerial strategy. Second, the coordination steered by AIFE resulted in a transformative change of the French state's financial and accounting structures through a layering process of change. Thereby, the article contributes to the empirical analysis of public administrations’ recent changes toward increased coordination at the central level by studying recent reforms in France and their outcomes. Points for practitioners This article shows that coordination processes within public sector organizations are context sensitive and depend on the behavior of the “agents of change” in charge of these processes. In contexts that are non-conducive to transformative change (e.g. siloed structures, presence of veto players), the set-up of agile, resourceful and autonomous change agents is key. When veto players may oppose structural change, the article suggests setting up network-based coordination processes aiming at incremental evolutions inducing transformative change.

Political Institutions

This chapter surveys theories and empirical evidence about the impact of state structures and political institutions on welfare state structures and outcomes. It shows that the political-institutional analysis of welfare states has shifted over time from an interest in static structures to a much more dynamic analysis of the interplay amongst preferences, structures, ideas, and institutions. It reviews different approaches to the study of political institutions, including majoritarian versus consensus democracy, veto points, and veto players. The impact of veto points on welfare state development and change, as well as the links between electoral systems and electoral dynamics on social policy outcomes, are explained and discussed. The chapter concludes with a review of the impact of past policies on welfare state politics and outcomes.

The Limits of Demand-Side Explanations

This chapter presents the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of all twenty-three EU policies that were successfully challenged before the WTO with reasonable periods to comply expiring before the end of 2019 and for which policy change was necessary for compliance. The chapter discusses how the conditions associated with compliance in the literature—the power of the complainant, the nature of the policy, and the number of veto players—are operationalized. The QCA finds that none of the conditions were necessary for compliance. It does, however, suggest (in line with expectations) that trade policy was sufficient for prompt and sufficient policy change. Contrary to expectations, however, the QCA strongly suggests that the power of the complainant was not associated with policy change. The analysis also found no association between the number of veto players and policy change. The QCA, therefore, contradicts the demand-side explanation of compliance and is consistent with the supply-side explanation. The chapter explores why the power of the complainant is not associated with policy change. It also contextualizes and justifies the case studies.

Conclusion

This chapter draws together the findings from the qualitative comparative analysis and the case studies (cross-case comparison) to debunk the demand-side account of compliance and qualify the impact of the number of veto players. It makes the case that the EU’s response to adverse WTO rulings is best explained by supply-side factors and that policy makers are motivated primarily by the rationalist considerations of reciprocity and reputation. The chapter considers how generalizable these conclusions are beyond the EU. It also reflects on the implications of the analysis for the effectiveness of the WTO and the character of the EU as an international actor. It concludes by reflecting on the utility of the concept of compliance.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the central puzzle that motivates the book: why, given the multitude of actors working to prevent and resolve violent conflict, does violence persist? The chapter then presents a theoretical approach to resolving the puzzle. It argues that variations in corporate conflict prevention result from changing local dynamics and shifts in governmental capacity, as well as threats to the ability to conduct business. It then goes on to describe how active corporations can prevent violence from occurring. Active engagement, however, can have a prolonging effect on the conflicts that occur, since corporations add additional veto players to negotiations. The chapter offers a preview of the main findings and concludes with a roadmap for the rest of the book and a preview of the implications of my central findings.

Not So Much Societal: The Catholic Church in Poland as a Veto Player

George Tsebelis distinguished two forms of veto players’ actions: institutional and partisan. In a democracy, the Church is not able to play either role because it is not an element of the state’s institutional structure. This was the source for Simon Fink’s proposal to look at the Church as a societal veto player (VP). The case of Poland shows, however, that such an approach becomes inadequate in numerous situations. The Church’s influence on political parties, and particularly the state’s institutions, may be exerted outside society. Performed on the basis of the existing literature and political debates conducted since 1989, the analysis of the social and political reality of Poland allows us to indicate the following four issues with respect to which the role of the Church as a VP The Church acted most often as a quasi-institutional VP (five cases), and once as a quasi-partisan VP. It never took actions based primarily on mobilizing society. This undermines the universality of findings and indicates the necessity of reconsidering the role of churches as societal veto players.

Policy Experimentation in Committees: A Case against Veto Rights under Redistributive Constraints

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than are the constraints on redistribution themselves. (JEL D72, C78, H23, D78, D71)