Acting for reasons: Reply to Dancy

The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched.

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Erratum: Acting for Reasons

The Philosophical Review ◽

10.2307/2185156 ◽

1987 ◽

Vol 96 (2) ◽

pp. 172

Keyword(s):

Acting For Reasons

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Acting Without Reasons

Disputatio ◽

10.2478/disp-2007-0011 ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 2 (23) ◽

pp. 229-246

Author(s):

Josep L. Prades

Keyword(s):

Practical Reasoning ◽

Intentional Action ◽

Practical Rationality ◽

Practical Conclusion ◽

Acting For Reasons

Abstract In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rationality and intentional action. If I am right, the fact that our intentions can be rationalised is widely misunderstood. Normally, it is taken for granted that the role of rationalisations is to show the reasons that the agent had to make up her mind. I will argue against this. I do not object to the idea that acting intentionally is, at least normally, acting for reasons, but I will propose a teleological reading of the expression ‘for reasons.’ On this reading, it is quite possible to act for reasons without having reasons to act. In a similar way, paradigmatic cases of cogent practical reasoning do not require the transference of justification from the premises to the practical conclusion.

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