Reasons in Action

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Unique Type ◽  
Acting For Reasons ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
The Way

The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 160-164
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Causal Power ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Unique Type ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Basic Action ◽  
Direction Of Fit ◽  
In Virtue Of

The overarching aim of this book is to provide a reductionist analysis of what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally perform the action that we have a reason for performing—an action that will in the end be a basic action—and intentionally achieve the end or goal for which we do this action, as specified by the reason. This analysis of intentional action is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any irreducibly action-theoretical concepts. It does not refer to anything that is unanalysably an action in virtue of involving either a unique type of agent-causation, or anything like a volition, trying, or decision that is assumed to be an act(ion) in a primitive sense. Nor does it refer to any unanalysable states or attitudes that are essentially directed at actions, like intentions and desires (to act). It does refer to a kind of desire—decisive desire—but it is in turn analysed as the causal power of some physical states in conjunction with propositional thinking. The direction of fit between thought and fact here is not that something is thought to fit the facts, but that something is caused to be fact because of how it is thought of....

The Intentionality of Actions

2019 ◽  
pp. 90-121
Author(s):  
Ingmar Persson
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Basic Action ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Mental Acts

According to the definition proposed by this chapter you intentionally perform the basic bodily action of causing p now if you now have an occurrent decisive desire to cause p directly—that is, without causing anything as a means to it—and this desire now causes something because you correctly and justifiably think that it is p. Since it has been claimed that conscious occurrences are not causally related, this account has to be modified to suit mental acts such as visualizing something. In this connection some rival theories of intentional action which refer to acts of will or volitions are critically examined. Finally, building on the definition of an intentional basic action, the notion of an intentional non-basic action is defined.

scholarly journals Gender (im)balance in citation practices in cognitive neuroscience

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline M. Fulvio ◽  
Ileri Akinnola ◽  
Bradley R. Postle
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Neuroscience ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
The Past ◽  
Broad Scope ◽  
Reference Sections ◽  
Growing Body ◽  
Systemic Factors ◽  
Citation Practices ◽  
Underrepresentation Of Women ◽  
The Way

AbstractIn the field of neuroscience, despite the fact that the proportion of peer-reviewed publications authored by women has increased in recent decades, the proportion of citations of women-led publications has not seen a commensurate increase: In five broad-scope journals, citations of papers first- and/or last-authored by women have been shown to be fewer than would be expected if gender was not a factor in citation decisions (Dworkin et al., 2020). Given the important implications that such underrepresentation may have on the careers of women researchers, it is important to determine whether this same trend is true in subdisciplines of the field, where interventions might be more effective. Here, we report the results of an extension of the analyses carried out by Dworkin et al. (2020) to citation patterns in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (JoCN). The results indicate that the underrepresentation of women-led publications in reference sections is also characteristic of papers published in JoCN over the past decade. Furthermore, this pattern of citation imbalances is present for all gender classes of authors, implicating systemic factors. These results contribute to the growing body of evidence that intentional action is needed to address inequities in the way that we carry out and communicate our science.

scholarly journals Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Joshua Shepherd
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
The Way

In the introduction the book’s central themes are introduced. Agents are often considered special, in that agents actively do things. Non-agents, by contrast, are zones of mere passivity. The aim of this book is to offer a perspective on agency that allows agency to stand out as special when compared to non-agentive systems. This perspective will be developed by way of interlinked explanations of the basic building blocks of agency, as well as its exemplary instances. Novel accounts of several key phenomena are developed: control over behavior, non-deviant causation, intentional action, skill, and knowledgeable action. Along the way the role of planning, practical reasoning, belief, and knowledge receive thorough discussion.

A Territorialidade Seringueira - Geografia e Movimento Social

GEOgraphia ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Carlos Walter Porto Gonçalves
Keyword(s):  
Action Theory ◽  
Main Term ◽  
The Social ◽  
Rubber Tappers ◽  
Class Struggles ◽  
The Way

Resumo O artigo parte do pressuposto que na expressão “luta de classes” o termo forte é “luta” e não “classes”, acompanhando o historiador inglês E. Thompson e o sociólogo francês P. Bourdieu. Assim, é a luta que cria o movimento social entre os seringueiros, evidenciando- se que são as lutas, e não o contrário, que dão origem às classes. O movimento social é visto, assim, rigorosamente como “mudança de lugar” (social). O movimento dos seringueiros significa a passagem da ação territorial à identidade que ela inventa, validando a teoria da ação de que é através das lutas que o implícito cresce e ganha a dimensão concreta do explícito. Palavras-chave: teoria da ação, luta territorial, identidade.Abstract This article has the pressuposition that in the expression “class struggles” the main term is “struggle” and don’t “classes”, likewise the english historian E. Thompson and the french sociologist P.Bourdieu. So, the struggle create the social mouvement among rubber- tappers, EVIDENCIANDO that the struggles originate classes, not the opposite. The social mouvement is seen exactly as “change of (social) place”. The rubber-tappers mouvement means the way from the territorial action to the identity it INVENTA, validating the action theory in which is by the struggles that implicit grows and receives the concret dimension of the explicit. Keywords: action theory, territorial struggle, identity.

scholarly journals Acting Without Reasons

Disputatio ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (23) ◽  
pp. 229-246
Author(s):  
Josep L. Prades
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Practical Conclusion ◽  
Acting For Reasons

Abstract In this paper, I want to challenge some common assumptions in contemporary theories of practical rationality and intentional action. If I am right, the fact that our intentions can be rationalised is widely misunderstood. Normally, it is taken for granted that the role of rationalisations is to show the reasons that the agent had to make up her mind. I will argue against this. I do not object to the idea that acting intentionally is, at least normally, acting for reasons, but I will propose a teleological reading of the expression ‘for reasons.’ On this reading, it is quite possible to act for reasons without having reasons to act. In a similar way, paradigmatic cases of cogent practical reasoning do not require the transference of justification from the premises to the practical conclusion.

The Unity of Action

2019 ◽  
pp. 49-92
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Way

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 19-27 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by considering Anscombe’s arguments that action is not intentional because of an “extra feature” of the agent, and that the concept of intentional action, as something to which a special sense of “Why?” can be given application, depends on the possibility of expressing intention for the future and describing one’s further intentions in acting. The chapter then considers Anscombe’s treatment of these last two concepts, showing how they yield a rich account of action as a teleological unity. Consideration is paid to the difference between Anscombe’s account of the unity of action and that of Donald Davidson. Finally, Anscombe’s account of the distinction between intention and foresight is discussed, with particular attention to the way that foreseen consequences stand in a different relation of dependency to an action than things that a person brings about intentionally.

Preliminaries

2019 ◽  
pp. 3-16
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Preliminary Discussion ◽  
The Future ◽  
State Of Mind ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Way

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 1-4 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. Attention is paid to the “three headings” under which she introduces her topic: expression of intention, intentional action, and intention in acting; and then to her preliminary discussion of expression of intention. Important concepts that are discussed in this chapter include the relation between the expression of intention and prediction, the question of what is described in expressing an intention, the difference between how expressions of intention and estimates of the future are grounded or justified, and the way that expressions of intention set the standard of correctness for the events that they describe. The chapter also explores Anscombe’s reasons for considering the topic of intentional action before attempting to characterize intention as an inner state of mind.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Agent Causation ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Standard Terminology

This chapter introduces key concepts and provides a preview of the book. Featured concepts include action, action-individuation, intention, intentional action, and free will. Some standard terminology in the literature on free will is introduced, including agent causation, compatibilism, determinism, incompatibilism, and libertarianism. The notion of free action central to the book is identified as moral-responsibility-level free action—free action of such a kind that if all the freedom-independent conditions for moral responsibility for a particular action were satisfied without that sufficing for the agent’s being morally responsible for it, the addition of the action’s being free to this set of conditions would entail that he is morally responsible for it.

Anscombe on Practical Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Observational Knowledge ◽  
The Way

The notion of “practical knowledge” is a central part of the philosophical account of intentional action in Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph Intention. It is characterized in a number of different ways: as a form of “non-observational” knowledge of what one is doing, as the way a person knows what she will do when this is grounded in an intention and not a mere prediction, as a “non-contemplative” mode of knowing that is “the cause of that which it understands.” The paper attempts to organize and show the coherence of these various strands in Anscombe’s conception of practical knowledge, and argues that it enables us to understand both how the agent’s perspective on what she is doing plays a constitutive role in the identity of the intentional action in question, while yet allowing that a person can fail to do what she takes herself to be doing.

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