Co-dependency of exchanged behaviors is a cue for agency attribution in 10-month-olds

Goal-directed social interactions (whether instrumental or communicative) involve co-dependent, partially predictable actions of interacting agents as social goals cannot be achieved by continuously exchanging the same, perfectly predictable, or completely random behaviors. We investigated whether 10-month-olds are sensitive to the co-dependence and degree of predictability in an interactive context where unfamiliar entities exchanged either perfectly predictable (identical), partially predictable (co-dependent), or non-predictable (random) signal sequences. We found that when—following the interactive exchanges—one of the entities turned in the direction of one of two lateral target objects, infants looked more at the indicated referent, but only in the partially predictable signals condition. This shows that infants attributed agency to the orienting entity and interpreted its turning action as a referential object-directed action. The present findings suggest that the co-dependency and partial predictability of exchanged behaviors can serve as an abstract structural cue to attribute intentional agency and recognize goal-directed social interactions.

Shared Intention, Organized Institutions

This chapter begins with the use of the planning theory of individual temporally extended human action in a construction of shared intention. It then develops a series of further constructions that build on each other: of Hart-type, criticism/demand-involving social rules; of authority-augmented social rules of procedure involved in the rule-guided infrastructure of an organized institution; of institutional intentions as outputs of social rules of procedure (where these intentions require neither corresponding shared intention nor a dense, holistic institutional subject); and of institutional intentional agency. These constructions articulate inter-related roles of our capacity for planning agency in important forms of human practical organization: temporally extended, small-scale social, and institutional.

Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework

This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical modeling is based on picking out an exemplary type of intentional agency, which is used as a model for other agential types. Theoretical modeling involves reasoning about intentional agency in terms of some domain-general framework of lawlike regularities, which involves no detailed reference to particular building blocks or exemplars of intentional agency (although it may involve coarse-grained or heuristic reference to some of them). Given the contrasting procedural approaches that they employ and the different types of knowledge that they embody, the three strategies are argued to provide mutually complementary perspectives on intentional agency.

What Does It Take to Be a Social Agent?

The aim of this paper is to present a philosophically inspired list of minimal requirements for social agency that may serve as a guideline for social robotics. Such a list does not aim at detailing the cognitive processes behind sociality but at providing an implementation-free characterization of the capacities and skills associated with sociality. We employ the notion of intentional stance as a methodological ground to study intentional agency and extend it into a social stance that takes into account social features of behavior. We discuss the basic requirements of sociality and different ways to understand them, and suggest some potential benefits of understanding them in an instrumentalist way in the context of social robotics.

Social partners’ bargaining strategies in Germany and Spain after the introduction of the Euro: A morphogenetic perspective on corporate agency

This article addresses how far wage imbalances in the Eurozone can be imputable to intentional agency by collective bargaining organizations. Using Archer’s morphogenetic approach, we explain the agentic role of social partners in core (Germany) and periphery (Spain) cases, in relation with the respective collective bargaining regimes. We show that the capacity of macro- and meso-level organizations to effect wage-setting practices can be constrained inadvertently by contextual influences with morphostatic properties, generating constrained modes of corporate agency. Yet wage moderation is best understood as a form of agency itself, functioning ‘by being’ rather than ‘doing’, which over time can become more innovative. We contrast this finding with the less constrained capacity of more institutionalized corporate agents, such as transnational business corporations and central state agencies.

Can Reasons and Values Influence Action: How Might Intentional Agency Work Physiologically?

In this paper, we demonstrate (1) how harnessing stochasticity can be the basis of creative agency; (2) that such harnessing can resolve the apparent conflict between reductionist (micro-level) accounts of behaviour and behaviour as the outcome of rational and value-driven (macro-level) decisions; (3) how neurophysiological processes can instantiate such behaviour; (4) The processes involved depend on three features of living organisms: (a) they are necessarily open systems; (b) micro-level systems therefore nest within higher-level systems; (c) causal interactions must occur across all the boundaries between the levels of organization. The higher levels constrain the dynamics of lower levels. The experimental evidence and theoretical arguments are shown to be consistent with previous research on the neuronal mechanisms of conscious choice, and with the interconnected multi-level processes by which organisms harness stochasticity, whether conscious or unconscious.

The Origins of Intentional Agency

As human adults, we experience ourselves as intentional agents. Here, we address how intentional agency and the corresponding agentive experiences emerge in infancy. When formulating a developmental theory of intentional agency, we encounter a so-called paradox of agency: three plausible theses regarding intentional agency that in combination seem to make it impossible for the developing infant to acquire a sense of agency. By recognizing various types of intentions, we propose a framework in which the paradox can be resolved, allowing infants to bootstrap their way to becoming intentional agents and experiencing a sense of agency.