Thomas Reid on active power and free agency

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-389
Author(s):  
Xiangdong Xu
Keyword(s):  
1994 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-622 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy O'Connor
Keyword(s):  

Locke Studies ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 33-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel C. Rickless

There is little agreement among scholars about how best to understand Locke's theory of moral agency, and his account of freedom in particular. Although some (e.g., Rickless and Garrett) think that Locke adopts a Hobbesian theory of freedom of action, as the ability to do or not do as one wills, while jettisoning the Hobbesian conception of the will as the faculty of desire, a growing number of commentators (e.g., Chappell, LoLordo, Lowe, Stuart, and Yaffe) believe that Locke departs more radically from Hobbes by supplementing a Hobbesian (or quasi-Hobbesian) conception of free action with an account of "full-fledged" free agency grounded in the very particular ability to suspend the prosecution of our desires. The most recent sustained effort in this direction has been very ably defended by Antonia LoLordo, and my aim in this paper is to examine and criticize her case for the "supplementarian" conception of free agency in Locke's Moral Man.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-541
Author(s):  
TERENCE CUNEO ◽  
RANDALL HARP

ABSTRACT:Thomas Reid has the unusual distinction of arriving at a metaethical position very much like G. E. Moore's via a route very similar to that employed by the Kantians. That is, Reid embraces a version of nonnaturalist moral realism by appeal not to open question-style considerations but to a particular account of agency. In this essay, we reconstruct Reid's agency-centered argument for his constitutivist version of moral nonnaturalism, highlighting its commitments. Having presented Reid's argument, we close by considering a prominent contemporary Kantian view, namely, Christine Korsgaard's, and identifying where, despite their common commitments, Reid and Korsgaard part company. The comparison, we suggest, is instructive because it allows us to see more clearly why the link between agency-centered approaches to ethical theorizing and nonrealist, constitutivist views of morality, such as Korsgaard's, is deeply contingent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Rakan Khalil Antar ◽  
Basil Mohammed Saied ◽  
Rafid Ahmed Khalil

A new control strategy for active power filters is proposed, modeled and implemented in order to improve the power quality of a line commutated converter High voltage DC link. The ability of reactive power and harmonics reductions are generally met by using passive and active power filters. In this paper, modified active power filter with a modified harmonics pulse width modulation algorithm is used to minimize the source harmonics and force the AC supply current to be in the same phase with AC voltage source at both sending and receiving sides of a line commutated converter high voltage DC link. Therefore, it is considered as power factor corrector and harmonics eliminator with random variations in the load current. The modified harmonics pulse width modulation algorithm is applicable for active power filter based on a three-phase five-level and seven-level cascaded H-bridge voltage source inverter. Simulation results show that the suggested modified multilevel active power filters improve total harmonics distortion of both voltage and current with almost unity effective power factor at both AC sides of high voltage DC link. Therefore, modified active power filter is an effective tool for power quality improvement and preferable for line commutated converter high voltage DC link at different load conditions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Shrock

Thomas Reid often seems distant from other Scottish Enlightenment figures. While Hume, Hutcheson, Kames, and Smith wrestled with the nature of social progress, Reid was busy with natural philosophy and epistemology, stubbornly loyal to traditional religion and ethics, and out of touch with the heart of his own intellectual world. Or was he? I contend that Reid not only engaged the Scottish Enlightenment's concern for improvement, but, as a leading interpreter of Isaac Newton and Francis Bacon, he also developed a scheme to explain the progress of human knowledge. Pulling thoughts from across Reid's corpus, I identify four key features that Reid uses to distinguish mature sciences from prescientific arts and inquiries. Then, I compare and contrast this scheme with that of Thomas Kuhn in order to highlight the plausibility and originality of Reid's work.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Mark Boespflug
Keyword(s):  

The common sense that heavily informs the epistemology of Thomas Reid has been recently hailed as instructive with regard to some of the most fundamental issues in epistemology by a burgeoning segment of analytic epistemologists. These admirers of Reid may be called dogmatists. I highlight three ways in which Reid's approach has been a model to be imitated in the estimation of dogmatists. First, common sense propositions are taken to be the benchmarks of epistemology inasmuch as they constitute paradigm cases of knowledge. Second, dogmatists follow Reid in taking common sense propositions to provide boundaries for philosophical theorizing. Inasmuch as philosophical theorizing leads one to deny a common sense proposition, such theorizing is stepping outside of the bounds of what it can or should do. Third, dogmatists follow Reid in focusing heavily on the problem of skepticism and by responding to it by refusing to answer the demand for a meta-justification that the skeptic wants.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Barrantes ◽  
Juan M. Durán

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the (common sense) idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's ( Cobb 2010 ) and Benbaji's ( Benbaji 2003 ) interpretations of Reid's views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation.


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