O ceticismo de G. W. Leibniz na leitura de Thomas Reid

O artigo avança a hipótese de que G. W. Leibniz apresenta um sistema cético de filosofia na leitura de Thomas Reid. Na primeira seção, mostra-se que, para Reid, Leibniz apresenta um sistema de filosofia completamente original em relação ao sistema de filosofia predominante no século XVII e XVIII, o sistema ideal. O sistema monadológico é original e, como se explica na segunda seção, tem implicações céticas semelhantes às do sistema ideal. Na leitura de Reid, há um ceticismo involuntário ou acidental que é resultado da adoção do princípio monadológico. Na terceira seção, mostra-se a originalidade da interpretação cética de Reid a partir de um cotejo com a literatura secundária sobre a filosofia leibniziana, assim como explica-se a compreensão reidiana do ponto de vista das interpretações idealista e fenomenalista do pensamento de Leibniz. Por fim, na quarta seção, elabora-se uma resposta reidiana ao sistema cético de Leibniz a partir de sua crítica ao sistema ideal.

The Efference Copy Signal as a Key Mechanism for Consciousness

Animals need to distinguish sensory input caused by their own movement from sensory input which is due to stimuli in the outside world. This can be done by an efference copy mechanism, a carbon copy of the movement-command that is routed to sensory structures. Here I tried to link the mechanism of the efference copy with the idea of the philosopher Thomas Reid that the senses would have a double province, to make us feel, and to make us perceive, and that, as argued by psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, the former would identify with the signals from bodily sense organs with an internalized evaluative response, i.e., with phenomenal consciousness. I discussed a possible departure from the classical implementation of the efference copy mechanism that can effectively provide the senses with such a double province, and possibly allow us some progress in understanding the nature of consciousness.

Intuitionist Particularism: An Introduction

This chapter lays out an account of the particularist approach to epistemological inquiry and develops a version of it in terms of epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic value (such as justification or knowledge). It begins by briefly reviewing the history of particularism, from Thomas Reid through G. E. Moore to Roderick Chisholm, and then gives a clear statement of the particularist methodology. The remaining sections elaborate the view, giving pride of place to epistemic intuitions, which is why the resulting view is called ‘intuitionist particularism.’ Particularism in epistemology (which tends to be endorsed by commonsense anti-skeptics) puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about particular cases and which of our beliefs are rational. It stands opposed to methodism, which is typically endorsed by proponents of radical skepticism and puts more weight on epistemic intuitions about principles that say what’s required for a belief to be rational. In their extreme forms, these positions occupy two ends of a spectrum. The position advocated in this chapter is a moderate one that leans toward the particularist end of the spectrum, in a way that is compatible with both internalism and externalism in epistemology.

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition rejects argument-based attempts to resist radical skepticism and advocates, instead, for noninferential intuition-based commonsense resistance inspired by the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. The book begins by setting aside closure-based arguments for radical skepticism and focusing on the more fundamental underdetermination arguments, which highlight the problematic gap between our evidence and our beliefs that are based on that evidence despite their truth being underdetermined by it. The rejected argument-based response to skepticism aims to provide good noncircular arguments from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs (e.g. our perceptual and memory beliefs) to the conclusion that those beliefs are true or at least probable. Part I of the book finds all such anti-skeptical arguments wanting. Part II lays out and defends a unique version of the commonsense Reid-inspired response to radical skepticism, with two distinctive features. The first is its self-conscious, explicit, and extensive reliance on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about the nature and exemplification of epistemic goods (such as justification or knowledge). The second is that it is ecumenical in the sense that it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Part III of the book responds to objections to the commonsense reliance on epistemic intuitions proposed in Part II, with special attention given to challenges from underdetermination, epistemic circularity, disagreement, and experimental philosophy.

O ceticismo de René Descartes na leitura de Thomas Reid

O artigo avança a hipótese de que René Descartes apresenta um sistema cético de filosofia na leitura de Thomas Reid. Há um tipo de ceticismo ‘involuntário’ ou ‘acidental’ que é resultado da adoção, da parte de Descartes, tanto de um método quanto de um princípio fundamentalmente céticos. Na primeira seção, mostra-se em que medida o método cartesiano da dúvida – que incide sobre a fiabilidade das faculdades mentais – é uma demanda cética impossível de ser satisfeita. Na segunda seção, mostra-se como o princípio do sistema cartesiano – que estabelece serem as ideias os objetos imediatos das operações da mente – não é apenas cético como conduz exata e naturalmente à mais radical das formas de ceticismo, o solipsismo. Na terceira seção, discutem-se as razões, segundo Reid, para o surgimento da dúvida sobre a existência dos objetos externos a partir de Descartes.

O fundacionalismo de Thomas Reid

O objetivo do artigo é discutir em que medida Thomas Reid está comprometido com uma teoria fundacionalista da justificação epistêmica. Para tal, apresentam-se duas discussões. Em primeiro lugar, argumenta-se que apesar de ser um fundacionalista em geral, Reid não o é em relação a todos os âmbitos do conhecimento - como é o caso da política. Para compreender essa hipótese, distingue-se sua concepção axiomática de ciência de sua visão fundacionalista da estrutura do conhecimento. Em segundo lugar, apresentam-se objeções às interpretações que pretendem que Reid é um antifundacionalista, um coerentista, ou um fundarentista.

Powers in Britain, 1689–1827

Scholastic physics and metaphysics emphasized both the notion of power in general and the notions of the many particular powers of creatures. But during the 17th and 18th centuries, powers came to be seen as suspect. This trend culminated in Hume’s denial that we have the idea of power his predecessors assumed we have. This chapter tells the story of the decline, fall, and eventual resurrection of the concept of power in Britain in the long 18th century. It focuses on differing accounts of the idea of power, the scope of power, and the metaphysical basis of power, as found in four figures: John Locke, David Hume, Thomas Reid, and Mary Shepherd.

On God as an Agent

This chapter contains the central contention of this volume, namely, that Christian theology and philosophy should conceive of God as an agent. It briefly outlines the intellectual and spiritual territory in which the claim “God is an agent” appears, some of which has been discussed in previous volumes: thus the chapter offers a recapitulation. Then it portrays the claim that God is an agent schematically, in dialogue with Thomas Reid. Then it discusses the motivation for thinking about God as an agent that recurringly appears in Christian theology and philosophy. Next, it raises a caution for thinking about God as an agent, and then it concludes by responding to central objections to this view.