Theistic evolution and evolutionary ethics: Henry Fairfield Osborn and Huxley’s legacy

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ceccarelli
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Ethics ◽  
Henry Fairfield Osborn

The evolutionary ethics of Alfred C. Kinsey

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 391-411
Author(s):  
Frederick Churchill
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Ethics

Cope: Master Naturalist. Henry Fairfield Osborn , Edward Drinker Cope

Isis ◽  
1933 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-293
Author(s):  
C. A. Kofoid
Keyword(s):  
Henry Fairfield Osborn

scholarly journals On the Naturalistic Fallacy: A Conceptual Basis for Evolutionary Ethics

2004 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 147470490400200 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Teehan ◽  
Christopher diCarlo
Keyword(s):  
Naturalistic Fallacy ◽  
Evolutionary Ethics ◽  
Conceptual Basis

scholarly journals Geneza moralności w świetle etyki ewolucyjnej

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020(41) (3) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Butowski ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Biological Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Evolutionary Ethics

The article draws out the issue of morality genesis in the point of view of chosen representatives of evolutionary ethics, understood as a biological theory of morality. Under this theory, morality is the result of cooperation of biologicial evoltion and cultural evolution.

All the Monkeys Aren't in the Zoo: Evolutionary Ethics and the Possibility of Moral Knowledge

2000 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 245-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Stingl
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Evolutionary Ethics ◽  
Evolutionary Perspective ◽  
Naturalized Epistemology ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Content

The error theory of moral judgment says that moral judgments, though often believed to be objectively true, never are. The tendency to believe in the objectivity of our moral beliefs, like the beliefs themselves, is rooted in objective features of human psychology, and not in objective features of the natural world that might exist apart from human psychology. In naturalized epistemology, it is tempting to take this view as the default hypothesis. It appears to make the fewest assumptions in accounting for the fact that humans not only make moral judgments, but believe them to be, at least some of the time, objectively true. In this paper I argue that from an evolutionary perspective, the error theory is not the most parsimonious alternative. It is simpler to suppose that mental representations with moral content arose as direct cognitive and motivational responses to independent moral facts.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document