W. QUINE, NATURALIZATION, SKEPTICISM AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE PROBLEM

The paper aims to show the relationship between the W. Alston’s idea about the formal independence of the contexts of “being justified” and of “knowing that one is justified” and the means to overcome the problems of skepticism within the naturalized epistemology by W. Quine. Based on some works – “From a Logical Point of View” (1963), “The Ways of Paradox” (1966), “Ontological Relativity” (1969) etc. – an attempt is made to reconstruct close to the text the possible answers that W. Quine may give to the skeptical challenge of the problem of justification of standards of justification and of the “conceptual change” problem. It is shown that W. Quine's response to the skeptical “challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science” can be understood as a reference of the independence of different “epistemic levels”, one of which is set by the “background” theory that provides the understanding of terms such “reality”, “evidence” and “justification”, and the other is related to the search for a more effective representation of the theory and determines the possibility of its change.

The Naturalized Epistemology Approach to Evidence

Studying evidence law as part of naturalized epistemology means using the tools and results of the sciences to evaluate evidence rules based on the accuracy of the verdicts they are likely to produce. This chapter introduces the approach and addresses skeptical concerns about the value of systematic empirical research for evidence scholarship, focusing, in particular, on worries about the external validity of jury simulation studies. Finally, turning to applications, it discusses possible reforms regarding eyewitness identifications and character evidence.

Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence: Methodological Reflections

<span lang="EN-US">This paper discusses Ronald Allen’s article, <em>Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence Revisited</em>, and reflects on how epistemology can contribute to our understanding of the evidentiary proof process. I first situate Allen’s critique of recent philosophical scholarship, distinguishing between general theoretical accounts of proof (including the theory that Allen and I have defended), on one hand, and the applications of specific epistemological concepts or issues to law, on the other. I then present a methodological picture that diverges in some respects from the one that emerges from Allen’s critique. In discussing this alternative methodological picture, I explain how epistemology can contribute to legal evidence and proof while avoiding the problems that Allen identifies.</span>

A Dynamical Perspective on the Generality Problem

The generality problem is commonly considered to be a critical difficulty for reliabilism. In this paper, we present a dynamical perspective on the problem in the spirit of naturalized epistemology. According to this outlook, it is worth investigating how token belief-forming processes instantiate specific types in the biological agent’s cognitive architecture (including other relevant embodied features) and background experience, consisting in the process of attractor-guided neural activation. While our discussion of the generality problem assigns “scientific types” to token processes, it represents a unified account in the sense that it incorporates contextual and common sense features emphasized by other authors.

CRITICAL POTENTIAL OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

The article explores the arguments in favor of feminist epistemology used in the works of L. Code, S. Harding, D. Haraway, J. Lloyd and other gender (radical) feminists. The sources of feminist epistemology are the naturalized epistemology and the thesis of underdetermination by W. Quine, the views of W. Sellars, Marxism, the strong program of sociology of knowledge, logical positivism. The features of feminist epistemology include many signature schemes, the tendency to use different schemes from suitable disciplines, rethinking of the concepts «knowledge» and «knower» for previously excluded or non-included groups of women, people with disabilities, representatives of different races, sexual minorities. Another feature is that «Feminine» experience and voice, viewed from an essentialist or non-essentialist approach, are considered the grounds for the position of «knower». The article examines the critical remarks made by feminists against the assumptions of traditional epistemology: universal human nature, «a view from nowhere», pureimpersonal reason, the assumption of «Robinsonade». Attention to subjectivity, values and selfish interests in the production of knowledge should be considered a merit of feminist epistemology. However, L. Laudan has already shown that no one, including representatives of feminist epistemology, have demonstrated the plausibility, let alone the veracity of judgements that justify any number of possible interpretations of the knowledge gained. The paper shows that feminist epistemology cannot avoid the well-known vicissitudes of epistemological relativism. However, feminist epistemology deserves the attention of philosophers because it is part of a broader relativist turn in social sciences and the humanities that seeks to extend its criticism to scientific knowledge.

An Analysis of Alvin Goldman’s Naturalized Epistemology

This work, “An Analysis of Alvin Goldman’s Naturalistic Epistemology,” aims at presenting the contributions of Alvin Goldman in am epistemic bent. As a branch of philosophy, epistemology has significantly advanced right from the classic, medieval, modern, and contemporary epochs. The effects of postmodernist thinkers’ radical approach to philosophy are evident in almost all philosophy branches. With the notion of doing epistemology through science championed by W.V.O. Quine, Alvin Goldman, John Kuhn, and some other scholars have raised objections and counter objections to such a deconstructionist mindset within the epistemic circle. Expectedly, these naturalistic epistemologists had discontinuity with one another in their positions. Goldman is concerned with such traditional epistemological problems as developing an adequate theoretical understanding of knowledge and justified believing. This paper shows that in his naturalistic discontinuity with Quine, Alvin Goldman did not conceive epistemology as part of science the same way Quine conceived it. Goldman’s view that answering traditional epistemological questions requires both a priori philosophy and the application of scientific results. Goldman’s naturalism is the view that epistemology “needs help” from science. His primary concern is in the area of traditional epistemological problems, including developing an adequate theoretical understanding of knowledge and justified believing. In this paper, I see Goldman’s divergence in the opinion of his naturalistic epistemology with Quine and other naturalistic epistemologists not as a problem but indeed part of epistemic consolidation. In the course of this work, analytic, evaluation, library research, and descriptive methods as well as internet materials, were employed.