Does licensing improve welfare with rent dissipation?

2021 ◽  
pp. 105655
Author(s):  
Rong Ding ◽  
Chiu Yu Ko
Keyword(s):  
Rent Dissipation

On a Fallacy in the Coase Theorem and the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven N. S. Cheung
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
General Version ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Rent Dissipation

AbstractThis paper first presents a historical account of the origin of the Coase Theorem. It then elaborates its significance in explaining the working of economic institutions. After expounding the concepts of transaction cost and rent dissipation, it points out an error in the Coase Theorem. Lastly, the paper propounds the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution as an extended and general version of the Coase Theorem.

Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery

2011 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 366-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Deacon ◽  
David Finnoff ◽  
John Tschirhart
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Rent Dissipation

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Bullock ◽  
E. Elisabet Rutström
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Test ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Rent Dissipation

scholarly journals Rent dissipation, free riding, and trade policy

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 (3-5) ◽  
pp. 795-803 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M. Grossman ◽  
Elhanan Helpman
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Rent Dissipation

Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation

2001 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 672-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyung Hwan Baik ◽  
Sanghack Lee
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Groups ◽  
Rent Dissipation

scholarly journals When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests

2012 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 170-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Faravelli ◽  
Luca Stanca
Keyword(s):  
Rent Dissipation ◽  
Less Is More

scholarly journals Voluntary Approaches to Transitioning from Competitive Fisheries to Rights-Based Management: Bringing the Field into the Lab

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunnar Knapp ◽  
James J. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Total Catch ◽  
Total Allowable Catch ◽  
Rent Dissipation ◽  
The Right ◽  
Voluntary Approaches ◽  
A Share

This paper describes a novel experiment designed to examine how rent dissipation may occur in fisheries in which the right to participate is limited and fishermen compete amongst themselves for shares of an exogenous total allowable catch. We demonstrate that rent dissipation may occur through multiple mechanisms, and that the heterogeneity of fishermen has important implications for how rent dissipation occurs and the extent to which different individuals may benefit from the implementation of rights-based management. We apply this approach to investigate the concept of voluntary rights-based management under which managers divide the total allowable catch between two separate fisheries, and fishermen may choose between fishing for a guaranteed individual harvest quota and competing for a share of the total catch in a competitive fishery.

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