Overlapping Climate Clubs: Self-Enforcing R&D Networks to Mitigate Global Warming

Free riding incentives make it difficult to control climate change. To improve the chances of the Paris Agreement’s ambitious goal, many nations are forming scientific networks in carbon capture and storage (CCS). These networks take many forms (bilateral, hub-and-spoke, and multilateral). Studies of social interactions among scientists demonstrate that research networks are limited because of relational issues, such as lack of trust. This paper provides a rationale for the formation of various types of international CCS networks and examines their impacts on climate change. Our concept of stability focuses on Nash equilibria that are immune to coalitional deviations in overlapping networks. Players may belong to various research networks. A particular research network is a climate club. We show that in the absence of top-down coordination in clubs, the type of global network that forms depends on relational attrition. The complex task is to mitigate free riding while enhancing trust.

Does Farmland Scale Management Promote Rural Collective Action? An Empirical Study of Canal Irrigation Systems in China

Farmland scale management represents an inevitable trend toward global modern agriculture. In the new development context, the key to solving the tough problem of the insufficient supply of rural public goods is to effectively improve the enthusiasm of farming households to participate in rural collective action in countries with a small arable area per capita, such as India, China and countries in Eastern Europe. This paper adopts the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework in the context of a land system with Chinese characteristics, and uses sample data of 3663 rural households in 17 provinces to study the impact of farmland scale and various relevant systems on farming households’ participation in rural collective action. We found that the advantages of collective action, such as reduced production costs, enhanced risk resistance and improved production efficiency, can offset the disadvantages incurred by free-riding behavior, and the expansion of farmland scale can significantly facilitate rural collective action. Additionally, as the farmland scale expands, stable farmland tenure and reasonable farmland tenure transfer can help to optimize the allocation of arable land resources, increase investment, and reduce free-riding behavior, thus effectively stimulating farming households to actively participate in collective action. However, since socialized agricultural services lead to the separation of the suppliers and the users of rural public goods, the expansion of farmland scale shows a negative effect. Therefore, in the context of the continuous migration of the rural population to cities, a stable farmland tenure adjustment mechanism should be established, while the balance between farmland tenure transfer and socialized agricultural services, in pushing forward rural collective action, should be emphasized, so as to ensure the effective supply of rural public goods in propelling farmland scale management. Especially in promoting the development of socialized agricultural services, more attention should be paid to specifying the responsibilities and obligations of the main provider of commercialized services in the supply of rural public goods.

A vaccine tax: ensuring a more equitable global vaccine distribution

While COVID-19 vaccines provide light at the end of the tunnel in a difficult time, they also bring forth the complex ethical issue of global vaccine distribution. The current unequal global distribution of vaccines is unjust towards the vulnerable living in low-income countries. A vaccine tax should be introduced to remedy this. Under such a scheme, a small fraction of the money spent by a country on vaccines for its own population would go into a fund, such as COVAX, dedicated to buying vaccines and distributing them to the world’s poorest. A vaccine tax would provide a much-needed injection of funds to remedy the unequal distribution of vaccines. The tax allows for a distribution that, to a lesser degree, reflects the ability to pay and is superior to a donation-based model because it minimises the opportunity for free-riding.

Global Climate Policy and Collective Action: A Comment

In a recent issue of Global Environmental Politics, Aklin and Mildenberger (2020) argue against the prevailing characterization of climate change cooperation as a problem of free riding or collective action. The authors argue that models of collective action imply (1) policy reciprocity and (2) inaction in the absence of formal agreements to limit free riding. They argue that neither empirical implication is supported by an review of states' climate policy to date. In this comment we note that standard collective action models imply neither of the above hypotheses. As a result the empirical tests advanced in the original article are uninformative as to the explanatory power of the collective action model for international climate politics.

Dynamic climate clubs: On the effectiveness of incentives in global climate agreements

A proposal to combat free riding in international climate agreements is the establishment of a climate club—a coalition of countries in a structure to encourage high levels of participation. Empirical models of climate clubs in the early stages relied on the analysis of single-period coalition formation. The earlier results suggested that there were limits to the potential strength of clubs and that it would be difficult to have deep abatement strategies in the club framework. The current study extends the single-period approach to many periods and develops an approach analyzing “supportable policies” to analyze multiperiod clubs. The major element of the present study is the interaction between club effectiveness and rapid technological change. Neither alone will produce incentive-compatible policies that can attain the ambitious objectives of international climate policy. The trade sanctions without rapid technological decarbonization will be too costly to produce deep abatement; similarly, rapid technological decarbonization by itself will not induce deep abatement because of country free riding. However, the two together can achieve international climate objectives.

Listening to vaccine refusers

In bioethics vaccine refusal is often discussed as an instance of free riding on the herd immunity of an infectious disease. However, the social science of vaccine refusal suggests that the reasoning behind refusal to vaccinate more often stems from previous negative experiences in healthcare practice as well as deeply felt distrust of healthcare institutions. Moreover, vaccine refusal often acts like an exit mechanism. Whilst free riding is often met with sanctions, exit, according to Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit and voice is most efficiently met by addressing concerns and increasing the quality and number of feedback channels. If the legitimate grievances responsible for vaccine refusal are not heard or addressed by healthcare policy, further polarization of attitudes to vaccines is likely to ensue. Thus, there is a need in the bioethics of vaccine refusal to understand the diverse ethical questions of this inflammable issue in addition to those of individual responsibility to vaccinate.