scholarly journals Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists

2019 ◽  
Vol 277 (2) ◽  
pp. 426-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxence Delorme ◽  
Sergio García ◽  
Jacek Gondzio ◽  
Jörg Kalcsics ◽  
David Manlove ◽  
...  
2020 ◽  
pp. 105128
Author(s):  
William Pettersson ◽  
Maxence Delorme ◽  
Sergio García ◽  
Jacek Gondzio ◽  
Joerg Kalcsics ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Begum Genc ◽  
Mohamed Siala ◽  
Barry O'Sullivan ◽  
Gilles Simonin

We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An (a,b)-supermatch is a stable matching in which if a pairs break up it is possible to find another stable matching by changing the partners of those a pairs and at most b other pairs. In this context, we define the most robust stable matching as a (1,b)-supermatch where b is minimum. We show that checking whether a given stable matching is a (1,b)-supermatch can be done in polynomial time. Next, we use this procedure to design a constraint programming model, a local search approach, and a genetic algorithm to find the most robust stable matching. Our empirical evaluation on large instances show that local search outperforms the other approaches.


2018 ◽  
Vol 723 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deeksha Adil ◽  
Sushmita Gupta ◽  
Sanjukta Roy ◽  
Saket Saurabh ◽  
Meirav Zehavi

Econometrica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2929-2974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Greinecker ◽  
Christopher Kah

We formulate a stability notion for two‐sided pairwise matching problems with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over the characteristics of the populations to be matched. Spaces of characteristics can be high‐dimensional and need not be compact. Stable matchings exist with and without transfers, and stable matchings correspond precisely to limits of stable matchings for finite‐agent models. We can embed existing continuum matching models and stability notions with transferable utility as special cases of our model and stability notion. In contrast to finite‐agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities.


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