Abstract
We find firm-level evidence that US banks receive preferential treatment in countries under IMF conditionality. We rely on investment location decisions to infer firms’ expectations about future profits and find that US firms are approximately 53 percent more likely to acquire financial firms in countries under financial conditionality. IMF programs without financial conditionality and FDI in other sectors serve as placebo tests. Financial conditionality has weak effects on investment decisions by non-US firms, which implies a political-economy interpretation. Firm-level data indicate that the distinctive behavior of US firms is not due to advantages of scale or to a US-firm fixed effect, but to US influence in the IMF. Firms from other major IMF shareholders benefit as well, but the effects are much weaker. The effects are concentrated in the politically relevant firms that have local affiliates, which is consistent with the interpretation that firms lobby for preferential treatment.
Stigma or cushion? IMF programs and sovereign creditworthiness
