Measurement Method and Application of a Deep Learning Digital Economy Scale Based on a Big Data Cloud Platform

In recent years, with the acceleration of the process of economic globalization and the deepening of my country's financial liberalization, the scale of international short-term capital flows has been extremely rapid. This article mainly studies the deep learning digital economy scale measurement method and its application based on the big data cloud platform. This article uses the indirect method to estimate the stock of renminbi circulating abroad. The results show that the application of big data cloud platforms can increase the development share of digital media and digital transactions in the digital economy, and optimize the structure of China's digital economy.

The Political Economy of the Profitability Crisis in Britain

This chapter provides a historical overview of the profitability crisis that undermined the postwar economic boom, gave rise to the phenomenon of stagflation, and ultimately drove the financial liberalizations explored in this book. This chapter puts forward a novel historical categorization of British stagflation, by identifying two distinct phases within Britain’s experience of the global profitability crisis. The first, from 1967 to 1977, was characterized by low rates of profit, rising inflation, and repeated current account imbalances that resulted in currency crises. The second, from 1977 to 1983, still saw low profitability and high inflation, but the rising price of sterling ensured that there were no sterling crises. The chapter then details how governments combined governing strategies of depoliticized discipline and palliation in different ways during these two periods of acute crisis in order to navigate the contradictory imperatives of global competitiveness and domestic legitimacy. Policies of financial liberalization constituted attempts to support these strategies.

Post-Neoliberalism and External Financial Liberalization: Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism

This article aims to discuss to what extent populist parties with opposite ideological backgrounds have differed in their policies towards inherited external financial liberalization (EFL). Building upon a comparative case study centred on Argentina under Kirchnerism (2003–15) and Hungary under Viktor Orbán (since 2010), I conclude that both experiences led to a partial EFL reversal. However, reflecting their opposite ideological underpinnings, each subtype of populism opted to restrict a different dimension of EFL. Argentina's left-wing populism re-regulated cross-border capital flows, harming financial operators, foreign investors and primary exporters through capital controls and export surrenders. These interventionist capital account regulations were needed to shield expansionary macroeconomic policies that attended the interests of subordinate socioeconomic strata, fuelling the tension with financial markets and domestic economic elites. Conversely, Hungary's right-wing populism focused on the ownership structure of the banking sector, aiming to redistribute assets from foreign to domestic private banks and improve the credit conditions for native capitalists. In this case, even when resorting to macroeconomic heterodoxy, the maintenance of fiscal balance and price stability retained support from both foreign investors and domestic business groups, mitigating tensions derived from financial nationalism.

Conclusion

This chapter reiterates the key arguments and findings of the book. The British state pursued financial liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s in an attempt to reconcile the demands of domestic civil society with the suffocating, impersonal pressures of the global economic crisis on Britain’s balances with the rest of the world. Financialization was an accidental result, not an intended outcome. In addition, this chapter explores how the four liberalizations examined here impacted upon the trajectory of financialization in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Britain’s liberalization of its financial sector boosted global capital mobility, and thus created powerful pressures on other states to follow suit, contributing to a dynamic of competitive deregulation that spread around the world. Further, the arm’s-length, depoliticized design of the 1986 FSA generated an institutional path dependency, whereby future British systems of financial governance would take a similarly light-touch form. This meant that London would incubate a series of banking scandals in the 1990s, as well as being home to some of the riskiest financial practices exposed by the 2008 crisis. Finally, the growing financial flows unleashed by the liberalizations of the 1970s and 1980s were increasingly channelled into the housing market, resulting in Britain’s particular dynamic of housing-centric financialization.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept of financialization, surveys the scholarly literature on this topic, and makes the case for this book’s novel contribution to these debates. It is widely recognized that the world economy has become financialized, yet the role of states in furthering this process has been underexamined. While many accounts point out that states were crucial in propelling financialization through policies of financial liberalization, these accounts tend to argue that the state did so either due to the lobbying power of financial elites and the influence of neoliberal norms or because policymakers were seeking to construct an alternative growth model based on financial accumulation. These two accounts of the role of states in spurring financialization—which can be termed interest-based and ideational explanations and functionalist explanations—fail to capture the reactive and ad hoc nature of the policymaking that resulted in financial liberalization. In the case of Britain, the agenda of financial liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s that propelled the City of London’s ascent was not chiefly driven by lobbying or ideology, nor was it intended to inaugurate a financialized growth model. Instead, by analysing declassified state archives, this book shows that policymakers pursued such policies as short-term measures to navigate through the stagflation crisis of that era. Financial liberalization was deployed in a messy fashion, either to postpone the worst effects of the crisis so as to maintain governing legitimacy, or to enact painful economic restructuring in a manner that shielded the state from political backlash.

Competition and Credit Control

This chapter explores the 1971 Competition and Credit Control financial liberalization, which saw the British state relinquish most of its direct controls over credit creation and instead rely on interest rates to govern lending. In the 1960s, Britain’s worsening trade performance had resulted in a series of currency crises, to which Harold Wilson’s government responded in 1967 by devaluing sterling. In aid of devaluation, the government enacted a series of contractionary measures. An important element of this disciplining strategy was the tightening of monetary policy through state-imposed lending ceilings. However, people proved resistant to this reduction in their living standards, and thus endeavoured to combat income losses by extending their bank borrowing. Further, due to falling profitability, companies faced a liquidity crisis that threatened to derail the export recovery. As such, the state authorities sought to use the lending ceilings to both restrict credit to persons and extend credit to companies. This hybrid disciplining/palliation strategy was extremely difficult to operate with the blunt monetary instruments at hand. In addition, the lending ceilings were becoming increasingly politicized. Consequently, the Treasury and Bank sought to discover a better system of monetary governance. It was the Bank that designed the uniquely arm’s-length CCC proposals. Yet these proposals were accepted by the Treasury and government in significant part because they appeared to offer a depoliticized mechanism through which the state could redistribute credit resources from persons to companies in aid of augmenting Britain’s world market competitiveness in a moment of intensifying crisis.

Framing Financialization and the State

In the age of financialization, it appears that financial elites dominate both the economy and politics. Indeed, much of the academic literature on the state’s role in propelling financialization argues that states liberated finance precisely due to the political power of finance capital and the influence of pro-finance, neoliberal ideas. This chapter, however, argues that during the 1970s and 1980s, when the most important financial liberalizations were passed, British policymakers were not directly dominated by an ascendant class of financiers. Rather, they found themselves indirectly dominated by the pressures of the global profitability crisis upon Britain’s economic balances with the rest of the world. This chapter theorizes this form of impersonal domination through an interpretation of Marx’s value theory. When the market-dependent agents of capitalist society interact through money-mediated commodity exchange, they unleash a dominating, competitive logic that sets them against one another in a race to raise labour productivity while pushing the economy into crises of falling profitability. Within this system, policymakers must simultaneously respond to the impersonal pressures of world market competition and maintain domestic legitimacy. In order to balance these contradictory imperatives, especially during crises, policymakers employ strategies of depoliticized discipline and palliation—the former seeking to impose competitive discipline on the domestic economy in a politically insulated manner, and the latter seeking to delay competitive market pressures so as to protect governing legitimacy. This chapter argues that the policies of financial liberalization pursued by the British state in this era can be understood through this lens.

Governing Financialization

Capitalism has become ‘financialized’. Since the 1970s, the swelling of financial markets and asset price bubbles has occurred alongside weaker underlying economic growth. Yet financialization was not a spontaneous market development—it was rather deeply political. States fuelled this process through policies of financial liberalization. Britain lies at the heart of this story. The British state’s radical financial liberalizations in the 1970s and 1980s were instrumental in creating a financialized global economic order in which the City of London emerged as a central hub. But why did the British state propel financialization? The conventional wisdom points to the lobbying power of financial elites and the strength of neoliberal ideology. However, this book offers an alternative explanation through an in-depth exploration of declassified state archives. By examining key financial liberalizations in the 1970s and 1980s—including the notorious ‘Big Bang’—this book argues that these policies were not part of an intentional scheme to create a new finance-led economic model. Instead, they were designed to address immediate governing dilemmas related to the grinding ‘stagflation’ crisis and its aftershocks. In this era, British governments found themselves trapped between global competitive pressures to enforce painful domestic adjustment and national political pressures to maintain existing living standards. Financial liberalization was pursued in a trial-and-error manner to navigate this dilemma. By unleashing financial markets, the state hoped to either postpone the worst effects of the crisis, or enact tough economic restructuring in an arm’s-length fashion. Financialization was an accidental outcome, not an intentional result.

The Impact of Financial Liberalization on the Value of the Bank: An Applied Study on Private Iraqi Banks for the Period 2011-2017

These aim to measure the impact of financial liberalization on the bank’s value for a sample of Iraqi banks listed on the financial market for the period (2011-2017). Quarterly data was used for a sample consisting of 20 banks to form a dashboard with a total of 560 views per variable. In return, five were used. Variables: (credit growth rate and deposit growth rate) are independent variables that express financial liberalization, (traded value, market value and book value) as dependent variables that express the bank’s accounting and market value, and by using the Panel Least Squares model, it was concluded that financial liberalization has an effect Positive for the value of the bank, and the study recommends that the monetary authorities implement more liberalization accompanied by the use of more stringent supervision tools.