The International Monetary Fund’s intervention in education systems and its impact on children’s chances of completing school

Enabling children to acquire an education is one of the most effective means to reduce inequality, poverty, and ill-health globally. While in normal times a government controls its educational policies, during times of macroeconomic instability, that control may shift to supporting international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While much research has focused on which sectors has been affected by IMF policies, scholars have devoted little attention to the policy content of IMF interventions affecting the education sector and children’s education outcomes: denoted IMF-education policies. This article evaluates the extent which IMF-education policies exist in all programs and how these policies and IMF programs affect children’s likelihood of completing schools. While IMF-education policies have a small adverse effect yet statistically insignificant on children’s probability of completing school, these policies moderate effect heterogeneity for IMF programs. The effect of IMF programs (joint set of policies) adversely effect children’s chances of completing school by six percentage points. By analyzing how IMF-education policies but also how IMF programs affect the education sector in low- and middle-income countries, scholars will gain a deeper understanding of how such policies will likely affect downstream outcomes.

Poverty, Inequality, and the International Monetary Fund: How Austerity Hurts the Poor and Widens Inequality

Among the drivers of socio-economic development, this article focuses on an important yet insufficiently understood international-level determinant: the spread of austerity policies to the developing world by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In offering loans to developing countries in exchange for policy reforms, the IMF typically sets the fiscal parameters within which development occurs. Using an original dataset of IMF-mandated austerity targets, we examine how policy reforms prescribed in IMF programs affect inequality and poverty. Our empirical analyses span a panel of up to 79 countries for the period 2002–2018. Using instrumentation techniques, we control for the possibility that these relationships are driven by the IMF imposing harsher austerity measures precisely in countries with more problematic economies. Our findings show that stricter austerity is associated with greater income inequality for up to two years, and that this effect is driven by concentrating income to the top 10% of earners while all other deciles lose out. We also find that stricter austerity is associated with higher poverty headcounts and poverty gaps. Taken together, our findings suggest that the IMF neglects the multiple ways its own policy advice contributed to social inequity in the developing world.

Multinational Banks and IMF Conditionality

We find firm-level evidence that US banks receive preferential treatment in countries under IMF conditionality. We rely on investment location decisions to infer firms’ expectations about future profits and find that US firms are approximately 53 percent more likely to acquire financial firms in countries under financial conditionality. IMF programs without financial conditionality and FDI in other sectors serve as placebo tests. Financial conditionality has weak effects on investment decisions by non-US firms, which implies a political-economy interpretation. Firm-level data indicate that the distinctive behavior of US firms is not due to advantages of scale or to a US-firm fixed effect, but to US influence in the IMF. Firms from other major IMF shareholders benefit as well, but the effects are much weaker. The effects are concentrated in the politically relevant firms that have local affiliates, which is consistent with the interpretation that firms lobby for preferential treatment.

The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality

Does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) increase inequality? To answer this question, this article introduces a new empirical strategy for determining the effects of IMF programs that exploits the heterogeneous effect of IMF liquidity on loan allocation based on a difference-in-differences logic. The results show that IMF programs increase income inequality. An analysis of decile-specific income data shows that this effect is driven by absolute income losses for the poor and not by income gains for the rich. The effect persists for up to 5 years, and is stronger for IMF programs in democracies, and when policy conditions, particularly those that demand social-spending cuts and labor-market reforms, are more extensive. These results suggest that IMF programs can constrain government responsiveness to domestic distributional preferences.