Corrigendum to “An experimental investigation of reputation effects of disclosure in an investment/trust game” [J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 94 (2013) 130–144]

2014 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 236
Author(s):  
Radhika Lunawat
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Investment Trust ◽  
Reputation Effects

An Experimental Investigation of Self-Serving Biases in an Auditing Trust Game: The Effect of Group Affiliation

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Group Norms ◽  
Group Affiliation

I report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the influence of noncredible communications and group affiliation on auditors' formation of self-serving bias. I find that manager-subjects use noncredible communications to induce auditors to develop an unwarranted trust of managers (i.e., a biased judgment). However, the bias is neutralized when auditor-subjects belong to groups that create social pressure to conform to group norms. Thus, my finding calls into question the Bazerman et al. (1997) conclusion that auditors cannot conduct impartial audits due to self-serving biases resulting from repeated interactions between auditors and their clients.

Language, Deception, and Social Loss in an Investment/Trust Game

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Dickhaut ◽  
Radhika Lunawat ◽  
Baohua Xin ◽  
Gregory B. Waymire
Keyword(s):  
Trust Game ◽  
Social Loss ◽  
Investment Trust

Do moods and expectancies have unique or interactive effects?: An experimental investigation

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Close ◽  
Victoria Adkins ◽  
Kandice Perry ◽  
Katheryn Eckles ◽  
Jill Brown ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Interactive Effects
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