Increased cooperative behavior across remitted bipolar I disorder and major depression: Insights utilizing a behavioral economic trust game.

2017 ◽  
Vol 126 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desmond C. Ong ◽  
Jamil Zaki ◽  
June Gruber
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Margoni ◽  
Elena Nava ◽  
Luca Surian

Most cooperative interactions involve the expectation of mutual reciprocation and are based on interpersonal trust. Thus, understanding when and how humans acquire interpersonal trust can help unveiling the origins and development of children’s cooperative behavior. Here, we investigated whether prior socio-moral information about trading partners modulates the choice of preschool- (4-5 years) and school-age children (7-8 years) to share their own goods in a child-friendly version of the Trust Game. In this game, the trustee partner can repay the child’s initial investment or keep everything and betray the trustor. In two studies, we addressed whether trust is modulated by trustees exhibiting prosocial versus antisocial behaviors (Study 1, ‘helpers and hinderers’), or respect-based versus fear-based power (Study 2, ‘leaders and bullies’). Preschoolers trusted the leader more than the bully, and trusted the hinderer less than a neutral agent, but did not yet trust the helper more than the hinderer. The tendency to trust helpers more than hinderers increased with age as a result of the increased propensity to trust the prosocial agent. In Study 3, a group of preschoolers played the Dictator Game, a measure of pure generosity, with the same agents used for Study 1. Sharing rates were reliably lower than in Study 1, suggesting that the rates of investment in the trust game cannot be due solely to altruistic or indirect reciprocity motives. Overall, these findings indicate that, by age five, children understand complex cooperative exchanges and start relying on socio-moral information when deciding whom to trust.


2009 ◽  
Vol 195 (6) ◽  
pp. 525-530 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Solomon ◽  
Andrew C. Leon ◽  
Jean Endicott ◽  
William H. Coryell ◽  
Chunshan Li ◽  
...  

BackgroundMuch remains unknown about the phenomenology of bipolar I disorder.AimsTo determine the type of bipolar I mood episodes that occur over time, and their relative frequency.MethodA total of 219 individuals with Research Diagnostic Criteria bipolar I disorder were prospectively followed for up to 25 years (median 20 years). Psychopathology was assessed with the Longitudinal Interval Follow-up Evaluation.ResultsOverall, 1208 mood episodes were prospectively observed. The episodes were empirically classified as follows: major depression, 30.9% (n = 373); minor depression, 13.0% (n = 157); mania, 20.4% (n = 246); hypomania, 10.4% (n = 126); cycling, 17.3% (n = 210); cycling plus mixed state, 7.8% (n = 94); and mixed, 0.2% (n = 2).ConclusionsCycling episodes constituted 25% of all episodes. Work groups revising ICD–10 and DSM–IV should add a category for bipolar I cycling episode.


Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Jessica V. Linley ◽  
Brian Roe ◽  
Keith L. Warren

Purpose Therapeutic communities (TCs) assume that residents are capable of working together to overcome substance abuse and criminal behavior. Economic games allow us to study the potential of cooperative behavior in TC residents. The paper aims to discuss this issue. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze results from a sample of 85 corrections-based TC residents and a comparison group of 45 individuals drawn from the general population who participated in five well-known economic experiments – the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, risk attitude elicitation and time preference elicitation. Findings TC residents keep less money in the dictator game and return more in the trust game, and prefer short-term rewards in the time preference elicitation. In the ultimatum game, nearly half of all residents refuse offers that are either too low or too high. Research limitations/implications While the study involves a sample from one TC and a comparison group, the results suggest that residents are at least comparable to the general public in generosity and appear willing on average to repay trust. A substantial minority may have difficulty accepting help. Practical implications Rapid peer feedback is of value. Residents will be willing to offer help to peers. The TC environment may explain residents’ tendency to return money in the trust game. Residents who refuse to accept offers that are either too low or too high in the ultimatum game may also have difficulty in accepting help from peers. Social implications Economic games may help to clarify guidelines for TC clinical practice. Originality/value This is the first use of economic games with TC residents.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dafina Petrova

This experiment investigated cooperative behavior in a two-person one-shot trust game by manipulating two types of information about the players - personality and previous behavior. When information about the counterpart was consistent, participants used the simple strategy to trust and reciprocate to trustworthy individuals and do the opposite with untrustworthy ones. When information was inconsistent, mainly behavioral information determined the decision to trust. Personality information mattered more for the choice to reciprocate. Different response patterns emerged depending on whether the participants were trusted with a big or a small endowment. Results support intention-based models of cooperative behavior, confirming that people use the opportunity to punish and reward. The Machiavellian personality scale designed to detect non-cooperators was administered but previous findings were not replicated.


Author(s):  
Inga Niedtfeld ◽  
Meike Kroneisen

Abstract Background Interpersonal disturbances in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) have been attributed to a negativity bias in social cognition. Adding to this literature, we experimentally tested whether those with BPD show altered memory for cooperative versus non-cooperative interaction partners. Methods In a source memory paradigm, 51 female BPD patients and 50 healthy controls (HC) played a trust game with 40 different female target characters (trustworthy vs untrustworthy). In a subsequent surprise memory test, participants had to recognize those target individuals (vs distractor pictures), and had to recall whether they had shown cooperative behavior during the trust game. We hypothesized that BPD patients have better memory for uncooperative interaction partners as compared to cooperative interaction partners, and that a-priori expectations of untrustworthiness would influence recall. Results During the trust game, BPD individuals invested lower amounts of money than HC for trustworthy targets, but no differences were found for untrustworthy targets. During the memory test, BPD patients had significant difficulties to remember cooperative targets, as compared to HC. More specifically, those with BPD indicated more often than HC that they had not previously interacted with cooperative targets of the previous trust game. We did not detect any differences between BPD and HC in source memory, or with regard to the effects of trustworthiness expectations. Conclusions The observed tendency to forget cooperative interaction partners in BPD is possibly caused by dysfunctional cognitive schemas. At the same time, it might also corroborate patients’ assumptions that others are untrustworthy, thereby fuelling interpersonal disturbances in BPD.


2012 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 955-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Sakalaki ◽  
Kyriaki Fousiani

According to Evolutionary Game Theory, multiple exchanges with partners are necessary to foster cooperation. Multiple exchanges with partners tend to enhance the good experience of the partners and the predictability of their behaviour and should therefore increase cooperativeness. This study explored whether social embeddedness, or the preference for close and stable social relationships, a variable which tends to increase multiple exchanges, is associated with more cooperative attitudes; and whether social embeddedness increases cooperative behavior towards unknown partners in a game situation. The first study, with 169 undergraduates, indicated that social embeddedness (preference for close and durable social relations) was negatively associated with opportunistic attitudes. The second study had a sample of 60 undergraduates playing a Trust Game with unknown partners and showed that self-reported social embeddedness was positively correlated with scores for cooperative economic behavior towards the partners. These results highlight the relationships of social embeddedness with cooperative attitudes and behaviour.


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