scholarly journals Framing in a threshold public goods experiment with heterogeneous endowments

2017 ◽  
Vol 138 ◽  
pp. 99-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kjell Arne Brekke ◽  
James Konow ◽  
Karine Nyborg
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Experiment ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Equilibrium Play and Learning in a Stochastic Public Goods Experiment

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Priyodorshi Banerjee ◽  
Sujoy Chakravarty ◽  
Ruchika Mohanty
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Dynamics of Provision of Threshold Public Goods

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud Z. Dragicevic ◽  
Jim Engle-Warnick
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Binary Decision ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

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