Rates the Ships Must Pay to Deliver the Oil Sludge as an Incentive to Improve Port Waste Green Logistics

Vessels of the shipping industry produce sludge during the operation of the main engine, various types of auxiliary engines, and the handling of fuel oil on board ships. The sludge can be stored in special tanks and disposed of ashore or burned on board. In the European Union, according to the Port Reception Facilities Directive (EU) 2019/883, ships have to pay a port waste fee for the delivery of ship waste, which is calculated according to the size of the ship. Such an approach does not take into account the capacity of port green waste logistics. In this paper, the case of delivery of ship sludge to ports that are similar in terms of waste logistics capacity is analysed. It is presented as a mathematical game between ships and ports to improve green waste logistics and match the amount of oil sludge that can be discharged from ships to the capacity of ports. The goal of the game is to discourage free-riders, which can occur on both sides, between suppliers and ports. The waste rate can be used as a regulator and incentive that discourages sludge dumping when recycling is not feasible. A model evaluation is proposed using a numerical example.

Active First Movers vs. Late Free-Riders? An Empirical Analysis of UN PRI Signatories’ Commitment

Joining voluntary thematic initiatives can be a means for firms to legitimate their business activities. However, a lack of review mechanisms could create incentives for free-riding. This might lead to a lower commitment to the initiative’s principles, and endanger its credibility and its members’ legitimacy benefits. Whether members of voluntary initiatives take advantage of the opportunity to free-ride has not been analyzed empirically so far. To fill this research gap, we investigate from an institutional theory perspective the actual implementation behavior of publicly listed signatories of the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) in a difference-in-differences and an event study setting. Our empirical results show that, after signing, UN PRI signatories integrate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria in their business activities significantly more than matched non-signatories from the financial sector, indicating the commitment of the signatories to the UN PRI in general. However, while the initial members show a high commitment to the initiative’s principles by increasing their ESG integration performance substantially, new members signing at a later stage of the initiative perform considerably less, and thus undermine the UN PRI’s credibility. We derive implications for voluntary thematic initiatives to avoid such a development.

Peer review in team-based learning: influencing feedback literacy

Background Peer review in Team-based learning (TBL) exists for three key reasons: to promote reflection on individual behaviours; provide opportunities to develop professional skills; and prevent ‘free riders’ who fail to contribute effectively to team discussions. A well-developed process that engages students is needed. However, evidence suggests it remains a difficult task to effectively incorporate into TBL. The purpose of this study was to assess medical students’ ability to provide written feedback to their peers in TBL, and to explore students’ perception of the process, using the conceptual framework of Biggs ‘3P model’. Methods Year 2 students (n = 255) participated in peer review twice during 2019. We evaluated the quality of feedback using a theoretically derived rubric, and undertook a qualitative analysis of focus group data to seek explanations for feedback behaviors. Results Students demonstrated reasonable ability to provide positive feedback, but were less prepared to identify areas for improvement. Their ability did not improve over time, and was influenced by the perceived task difficulty; social discomfort; and sense of responsibility in providing written feedback. Conclusions To increase student engagement, we require a transparent process that incorporates verbal feedback and team discussion, with monitoring of outcomes by faculty and adequate training.

Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

Fintech platforms: Lax or careful borrowers’ screening?

Can peer-to-peer lending platforms mitigate fraudulent behaviors? Or have lending players been acting similar to free-riders? This paper constructs a new proxy to investigate lending platform misconduct and compares the FICO score and the LendingClub credit grade. To examine whether the lack of verification by the Fintech platform affects lenders’ collection performance, I explore the recovery rate (RR) of non-performing loans through a mixed-continuous model. The regression results show that the degree of prudence taken by the lending platform in the pre-screening activity negatively affects the detection of some misreporting borrowers. I also find that the Fintech platform’s missing verification information (e.g., annual income and employment length) affects the RR of non-performing loans, thereby hampering lenders’ collection performance.

Nodes with the highest control power play an important role at the final level of cooperation in directed networks

Controllability of complex networks aims to seek the lowest number of nodes (the driver nodes) that can control all the nodes by receiving the input signals. The concept of control centrality is used to determine the power of each node to control the network. The more a node controls the nodes through connections in the network, the more it has the power to control. Although the cooperative and free-rider strategies and the final level of cooperation in a population are considered and studied in the public goods game. However, it is yet to determine a solution to indicate the effectiveness of each member in changing the strategies of the other members. In a network, the choice of nodes effective in changing the other nodes’ strategies, as free-riders, will lead to lower cooperation and vice versa. This paper uses simulated and real networks to investigate that the nodes with the highest control power are more effective than the hubs, local, and random nodes in changing the strategies of the other nodes and the final level of cooperation. Results indicate that the nodes with the highest control power as free-riders, compared to the other sets being under consideration, can lead to a lower level of cooperation and are, therefore, more effective in changing the strategies of the other nodes. The obtained results can be considered in the treatment of cancer. So that, destroying the tumoral cells with the highest control power should be a priority as these cells have a higher capability to change the strategies of the other cells from cooperators to free-riders (healthy to tumoral).

Vaccine Refusal Is Not Free Riding

Vaccine refusal is not a free rider problem. The claim that vaccine refusers are free riders is inconsistent with the beliefs and motivations of most vaccine refusers. This claim also inaccurately depicts the relationship between an individual’s immunization choice, their ability to enjoy the benefits of community protection, and the costs and benefits that individuals experience from immunization and community protection. Modeling vaccine refusers as free riders also likely distorts the ethical analysis of vaccine refusal and may lead to unsuccessful policy interventions.

Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators

It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not considered key behavior regularities observed in experimental and field settings, where the individuals behave like conditional cooperators who are more willing to donate and are also more willing to punish free riders. Considering these behavioral regularities, without imposing a spatial structure on the population, I propose an evolutionary agent-based model in which agents behave like conditional cooperators, each agent’s donation conditional on the difference between the number of donations in the past and the threshold value and the propensity value of the agent. Altruistic punishment depends on the difference between the threshold value of the focal agent and the randomly matched another agent. The simulations show that, for certain inflicted costs of punishments, generous altruistic punishments evolve and stabilize cooperation. The results show that, unlike previous models, it is not necessary to punish all free riders equally; it is necessary to do so in the case of the selfish free riders but not in the case of negative reciprocators.

Inter-Regional Cooperation (KAD) based institution in the tourism sector in Madura

This study aims to analyze the Inter-Regional Cooperation (KAD) institution in the tourism sector in Madura to support Presidential Regulation Number 80 of 2019 concerning the DEWI CEMARA program (Tourism Village with Smart, Independent, and Prosperous Communities). This qualitative research has used the triangulation method for data collection. This study shows great potentials have supported tourism development in Madura; yet, they have complex problems. This problem has led to the establishment of the KAD in the tourism sector in Madura, whose aim is to exploit the regional potential and overcome tourism problems collectively using mutual benefit principles. From 2017 to the present, these objectives have not been achieved due to the following reasons: (1) KAD has not been supported by the commitment of regional heads who are willing to facilitate cross-sector and cross-regional cooperation and resources; (2) KAD has not been supported by cross-sectoral and cross-regional planning documents; (3) no good cooperation occurs among the government, the private sector and the community; and (4) moral hazard such as egoistic/opportunistic, free riders, and tragedy of common are still obviously seen

Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.