Heterogeneous investments induced by emotions promote cooperation in public goods games

Emotion plays an important role in heterogeneous investments and has some direct effects on the cooperation behaviour of a player in a public goods game (PGG). How this irrational factor affects the heterogeneous investments and what level of cooperators in players with emotions are still unknown to us. Here, the heterogeneous investments induced by emotions into a PGG were introduced. The emotional index was firstly quantified by considering a memory-cumulative effect, and then an investment formula was proposed based on this emotional index. At last, the effect of emotions on the cooperation behaviour in a PGG was investigated. Results show that the heterogeneous investments induced by emotions can improve cooperation significantly in a PGG, and that an increase of the memory length, the emotional increment, or the memory discounting factor can improve the cooperation level.

“Just Words? Just Speeches?” On the Economic Value of Charismatic Leadership

Leadership theories in sociology and psychology argue that effective leaders influence follower behavior not only through the design of incentives and institutions, but also through personal abilities to persuade and motivate. Although charismatic leadership has received considerable attention in the management literature, existing research has not yet established causal evidence for an effect of leader charisma on follower performance in incentivized and economically relevant situations. We report evidence from field and laboratory experiments that investigate whether a leader’s charisma—in the form of a stylistically different motivational speech—can induce individuals to undertake personally costly but socially beneficial actions. In the field experiment, we find that workers who are given a charismatic speech increase their output by about 17% relative to workers who listen to a standard speech. This effect is statistically significant and comparable in size to the positive effect of high-powered financial incentives. We then investigate the effect of charisma in a series of laboratory experiments in which subjects are exposed to motivational speeches before playing a repeated public goods game. Our results reveal that a higher number of charismatic elements in the speech can increase public good contributions by up to 19%. However, we also find that the effectiveness of charisma varies and appears to depend on the social context in which the speech is delivered. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

A preference to learn from successful rather than common behaviours in human social dilemmas

Human cooperation is often claimed to be special and requiring explanations based on gene–culture coevolution favouring a desire to copy common social behaviours. If this is true, then individuals should be motivated to both observe and copy common social behaviours. Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals' desire to sacrifice for the common good and to copy common social behaviours. However, previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, whether individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same social dilemma and standard instructions, we find that individuals were primarily motivated to learn from successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavoured costly cooperation, even when individuals could observe a stable, pro-social level of cooperation. Our results call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to conform with common social behaviours. Instead, our results indicate that participants were motivated by personal gain, but initially confused, despite receiving standard instructions. When individuals could learn from success, they learned to cooperate less, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so special after all.

The Influence of the Benefit Redistribution Method on the Willingness to Voluntary Contribute to Public Goods Provision Classroom Experiment

Currently we are facing Covid 19 pandemics and it opens many questions about willingness of individuals to give up some private pleasure to contribute to public wellbeing. Theoretical economic research suggest that methodology of group account distribution does affect the contribution size. Lawyers, politicians and economists try to answer these questions using various scientific approaches and methods. One of them is to examine the willingness of individuals to contribute to public goods. Using a laboratory classroom experiment, we test various situations through public goods game. We examine whether economic entities are willing to contribute in situations when it is not advantageous for them from an individual point of view, but it is advantageous for society.

Reciprocity and Social Norms: Short- and Long-Run Crowding Out Effects of Financial Incentives

We link the reciprocity model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with the theory of normative social behavior to study how financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation in both the short and long runs. Using data from a lab-based repeated public goods game, we find strong evidence in support of the reciprocity model and crowding out effects both when the payment is in place and after it stops. When the payment program is in place, subjects become less sensitive to reciprocity, perceive less kindness in others’ contributions, and care less about others’ welfare. The overall decrease in motivation to reciprocate reduces the effectiveness of the payment program by almost 50%. About 20% of the crowding out effect persists after the payment stops, and the reciprocity mechanism explains over three quarters of the long-run crowding out effect.

Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.