scholarly journals Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication

2020 ◽  
Vol 169 ◽  
pp. 158-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas van Elten ◽  
Stefan P. Penczynski
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Group Communication ◽  
Coordination Games

scholarly journals AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF UNCERTAINTY IN COORDINATION GAMES

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 751-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christos A. Ioannou ◽  
Miltiadis Makris
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Coordination Games

scholarly journals Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 946-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy N. Cason ◽  
Roman M. Sheremeta ◽  
Jingjing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Group Communication ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Competitive Coordination

scholarly journals Ignorance Is Bliss: An Experimental Study of the Use of Ambiguity and Vagueness in the Coordination Games with Asymmetric Payoffs

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Agranov ◽  
Andrew Schotter
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
The World ◽  
The Asymmetry

We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)

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