scholarly journals Equilibrium Selection through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Cabrales ◽  
Rosemarie Nagel ◽  
Roc Armenter
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Coordination Games

scholarly journals Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Cabrales ◽  
Rosemarie Nagel ◽  
Roc Armenter
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Coordination Games

Equilibrium Selection in Network Coordination Games: An Experimental Study

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenz Frey ◽  
Rense Corten ◽  
Vincent Buskens
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Network Coordination

scholarly journals Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study

2016 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-433
Author(s):  
Jia Liu ◽  
Yohanes E. Riyanto
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Coordination Games ◽  
Information Transparency

Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study

1996 ◽  
Vol 106 (436) ◽  
pp. 593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Guth ◽  
Steffen Huck ◽  
Peter Ockenfels
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Ultimatum Bargaining

scholarly journals AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF UNCERTAINTY IN COORDINATION GAMES

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 751-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christos A. Ioannou ◽  
Miltiadis Makris
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Coordination Games

Generalized Belief Operator and Robustness in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 693-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daisuke Oyama ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
High Probability ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Supermodular Games ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Global Game ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
Type Spaces ◽  
Action Profile

This paper studies the robustness of an equilibrium to incomplete information in binary‐action supermodular games. Using a generalized version of belief operator, we explore the restrictions that prior beliefs impose on higher order beliefs. In particular, we obtain a nontrivial lower bound on the probability of a common belief event, uniform over type spaces, when the underlying game has a monotone potential. Conversely, when the game has no monotone potential, we construct a type space with an arbitrarily high probability event in which players never have common belief about that event. As an implication of these results, we show for generic binary‐action supermodular games that an action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. Our study offers new methodology and insight to the analysis of global game equilibrium selection.

scholarly journals Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

2013 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 1516-1544 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. I. Hoppe ◽  
P. W. Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Social Preferences
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