Priority classes and weighted constrained equal awards rules for the claims problem

2015 ◽  
Vol 160 ◽  
pp. 36-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak
Author(s):  
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ◽  
Josep E. Peris ◽  
Begoña Subiza

2016 ◽  
Vol 136 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 693-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ◽  
Jordi Teixidó-Figueras ◽  
Cori Vilella

2005 ◽  
Vol 137 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Borm ◽  
Luisa Carpente ◽  
Balbina Casas-Méndez ◽  
Ruud Hendrickx

Water Policy ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 479-495 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu ◽  
Weijun He ◽  
Jian Hua Zhao

Designing a feasible and stable water sharing mechanism for transboundary river basins is a big challenge. The stochastic and uncertain characteristics of water flow in these rivers is among the main reasons which make the formation of cooperative coalitions with feasible water allocations and self-enforceable allocation agreements difficult. When the water in these river basins is scarce the task becomes even more challenging. This article focuses on the application of stochastic game theoretic extension of the bankruptcy concept to transboundary water resource sharing under water scarce and uncertain conditions. Among the water allocation vectors obtained from stochastic bankruptcy rules only the ones from the stochastic constrained equal awards rule were self-enforcing under uncertainty. Furthermore, the authors also proposed an allocation rule that can be used under a stochastic setting. The proposed rule provides water allocations that are self-enforcing in the absence of uncertainty. Generally, the application of the stochastic bankruptcy approach could be a source of important strategic information which can serve for the sustainable sharing and management of these vital sources of fresh water, particularly during water scarcity.


Author(s):  
María-José Solís-Baltodano ◽  
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ◽  
Josep E. Peris

AbstractIn order to support economic development across all European Union regions, €351.8 billion –almost a third of the total EU budget– has been set aside for the Cohesion Policy during the 2014–2020 period. The distribution of this budget is made through five main structural and investment funds, after long and difficult negotiations among the EU member states. This paper analyzes the problem of allocating the limited resources of the European Regional Development Fund as a conflicting claims problem. Specifically, we attempt to show how the conflicting claims approach fits this actual problem, and we propose alternative ways of distributing the budget via (i) claims solutions or (ii) the imposition of bounds (guarantees) to each of the regions. By applying this approach we also show that there is a claims solution that performs better than the others by reducing inequality and promoting convergence to a greater degree. It is clear that political bargaining will always be part of the allocation process. However, having an intuitive initial proposal may help politicians to find the best agreement. To that effect, we propose the use of a claims solution as a way to find an initial proposal for future policy changes concerning the allocations of the EU structural funds.


2020 ◽  
Vol 86 ◽  
pp. 104652 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Antonio Duro ◽  
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ◽  
Cori Vilella
Keyword(s):  

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