scholarly journals Economic uncertainty and corruption: Evidence from public and private firms

2021 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 100936
Author(s):  
Mansoor Afzali ◽  
Gönül Ҫolak ◽  
Mengchuan Fu
2017 ◽  
Vol 140 ◽  
pp. 336-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liisa T. Laine ◽  
Ching-to Albert Ma

Author(s):  
Darren R. Halpin ◽  
Anthony J. Nownes

The book begins by introducing the Silicon Valley 150+, the 175 biggest public and private firms in Silicon Valley, and discusses the intent of the book: to examine the political engagement of those individuals who founded and are CEOs of the SV150+ firms. This chapter introduces the main themes of the book, positioning the book against literatures covering business lobbying, political donations by firms, philanthropy and public policy, and the formation of new advocacy organizations. The chapter also includes three important lists: (1) the SV150+ firm list—the list of Silicon Valley firms the book studies; (2) the SV150+ CEO list—the list of CEOs the book studies; and (3) the SV150+ founder list—the list of founders the book studies. The chapter concludes with an overview of the chapters to come.


2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Po-Hsuan Hsu ◽  
Kai Li

We compare innovation strategies of public and private firms based on a large sample over the period 1997–2008. We find that public firms’ patents rely more on existing knowledge, are more exploitative, and are less likely in new technology classes, while private firms’ patents are broader in scope and more exploratory. We investigate whether these strategies are due to differences in firm information environments, CEO risk preferences, firm life cycles, corporate acquisition policies, or investment horizons between these two groups of firms. Our evidence suggests that the shorter investment horizon associated with public equity markets is a key explanatory factor.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 583-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
Kai Li

We compare chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in public and large private firms. Public firms have higher turnover rates and exhibit greater turnover–performance sensitivity (TPS) than private firms. When we control for pre-turnover performance, performance improvements are greater for private firms than for public firms. We investigate whether these differences are due to differences in quality of accounting information, the CEO candidate pool, CEO power, board structure, ownership structure, investor horizon, or certain unobservable differences between public and private firms. One factor contributing to public firms’ higher turnover rates and greater TPS appears to be investor myopia.


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