Evolutionary stability of egg trading and parceling in simultaneous hermaphrodites: The chalk bass revisited

2007 ◽  
Vol 246 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip H. Crowley ◽  
Mary K. Hart
2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 709-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nico K. Michiels ◽  
Philip H. Crowley ◽  
Nils Anthes

Sex allocation (SA) models are traditionally based on the implicit assumption that hermaphroditism must meet criteria that make it stable against transition to dioecy. This, however, puts serious constraints on the adaptive values that SA can attain. A transition to gonochorism may, however, be impossible in many systems and therefore realized SA in hermaphrodites may not be limited by conditions that guarantee stability against dioecy. We here relax these conditions and explore how sexual selection on male accessory investments (e.g. a penis) that offer a paternity benefit affects the evolutionary stable strategy SA in outcrossing, simultaneous hermaphrodites. Across much of the parameter space, our model predicts male allocations well above 50 per cent. These predictions can help to explain apparently ‘maladaptive’ hermaphrodite systems.


1991 ◽  
Vol 137 (6) ◽  
pp. 907-911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas W. Morris

2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 859-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cyrille Conord ◽  
Laurence Despres ◽  
Agnès Vallier ◽  
Séverine Balmand ◽  
Christian Miquel ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Roland Mühlenbernd ◽  
Sławomir Wacewicz ◽  
Przemysław Żywiczyński

AbstractPoliteness in conversation is a fascinating aspect of human interaction that directly interfaces language use and human social behavior more generally. We show how game theory, as a higher-order theory of behavior, can provide the tools to understand and model polite behavior. The recently proposed responsibility exchange theory (Chaudhry and Loewenstein in Psychol Rev 126(3):313–344, 2019) describes how the polite communications of thanking and apologizing impact two different types of an agent’s social image: (perceived) warmth and (perceived) competence. Here, we extend this approach in several ways, most importantly by adding a cultural-evolutionary dynamics that makes it possible to investigate the evolutionary stability of politeness strategies. Our analysis shows that in a society of agents who value status-related traits (such as competence) over reciprocity-related traits (such as warmth), both the less and the more polite strategies are maintained in cycles of cultural-evolutionary change.


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