Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

Males as somatic investment in a parthenogenetic nematode

We report the reproductive strategy of the nematode Mesorhabditis belari. This species produces only 9% males, whose sperm is necessary to fertilize and activate the eggs. However, most of the fertilized eggs develop without using the sperm DNA and produce female individuals. Only in 9% of eggs is the male DNA utilized, producing sons. We found that mixing of parental genomes only gives rise to males because the Y-bearing sperm of males are much more competent than the X-bearing sperm for penetrating the eggs. In this previously unrecognized strategy, asexual females produce few sexual males whose genes never reenter the female pool. Here, production of males is of interest only if sons are more likely to mate with their sisters. Using game theory, we show that in this context, the production of 9% males by M. belari females is an evolutionary stable strategy.