Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation

2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Rules

scholarly journals Social choice rules driven by propositional logic

2013 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-312
Author(s):  
Rosa Camps ◽  
Xavier Mora ◽  
Laia Saumell
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Social Choice Rules

On combining implementable social choice rules

2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Pierre Benoît ◽  
Efe A. Ok ◽  
M. Remzi Sanver
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Choice Rules

Three Social Choice Rules

2017 ◽  
pp. 54-71
Author(s):  
Andrei Marius Vlăducu
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Borda Count ◽  
Social Choice Rule ◽  
Status Quo Bias ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
The People ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
Social Choice Rules

The authors analyze three social choice rules (plurality voting, approval voting and Borda count) from a behavioral economics perspective aiming three objectives: 1) if it is a viable solution to use these procedures during mass elections; 2) why individuals prefer a specific social choice rule and not another; 3) how status quo bias and framing effect influence the preference of individuals for a certain social choice rule. The research is conducted with 87 participants to a lab experiment and data suggest that for using approval voting and Borda count during mass elections is necessary to increase the people level of information about their benefits. When making a decision in a political or economic context seem that people tend to prefer simple plurality rule do to its availability and maybe because of its strong reliance with status quo bias.

scholarly journals On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 17-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus-Jochen Haake ◽  
Walter Trockel
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Maskin Monotonicity ◽  
Social Choice Rules

Arrow’s Theorem

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Conal Duddy ◽  
Ashley Piggins
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Social Preference ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Preference Ordering ◽  
Individual Values ◽  
Arrow’S Theorem ◽  
Arrow's Theorem

Kenneth Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem is rightly considered to be a landmark result in economic theory. It is a far-reaching result with implications not just for economics but for political science, philosophy, and many other fields. It has inspired an enormous literature, “social choice theory,” which lies on the interface of economics, politics, and philosophy. Arrow first proved the impossibility theorem in his doctoral dissertation—Social Choice and Individual Values—published in 1951. It is a remarkable result, and had Arrow not proved it, it is unlikely that the theorem would be known today. A social choice is simply a choice made by, or on behalf of, a group of people. Arrow’s theorem is concerned more specifically with the following problem. Suppose that we have a given set of options to choose from and that each member of a group of individuals has his or her own preference over these options. By what method should we construct a single ranking of the options for the group as a whole? Any such method may be represented mathematically by a “social welfare function.” This is a function that receives as its input the preference ordering of each individual and then generates as its output a social preference ordering. Arrow defined some properties that would seem to be essential to any reasonable social welfare function. These properties are called “unrestricted domain,” “weak Pareto,” “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” and “non-dictatorship.” Each of these properties, when taken alone, does appear to be very necessary indeed. Yet, Arrow proved that these properties are in fact mutually incompatible. This troubling fact has been central to the study of social choice ever since.

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