Time consistent cooperative solutions for multistage games with vector payoffs

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Kuzyutin ◽  
Mariya Nikitina
Keyword(s):  
Multistage Games ◽  
Vector Payoffs ◽  
Cooperative Solutions ◽  
Games With Vector Payoffs

scholarly journals Attainability in Repeated Games with Vector Payoffs

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 739-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dario Bauso ◽  
Ehud Lehrer ◽  
Eilon Solan ◽  
Xavier Venel
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Vector Payoffs ◽  
Games With Vector Payoffs

Infinite Player Noncooperative Games with Vector Payoffs Under Relative Pseudomonotonicity

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Allevi ◽  
A. Gnudi ◽  
I. V. Konnov ◽  
S. Schaible
Keyword(s):  
Noncooperative Games ◽  
Vector Payoffs ◽  
Games With Vector Payoffs

Noncooperative Games with Vector Payoffs Under Relative Pseudomonotonicity

2003 ◽  
Vol 118 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Allevi ◽  
A. Gnudi ◽  
I.V. Konnov ◽  
S. Schaible
Keyword(s):  
Noncooperative Games ◽  
Vector Payoffs ◽  
Games With Vector Payoffs

scholarly journals A Note on Strategic Stability of Cooperative Solutions for Multistage Games

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wang ◽  
Cui Liu ◽  
Juan Xue ◽  
Hongwei Gao
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
General Characteristic ◽  
Characteristic Functions ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
Multistage Games ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
Cooperative Solutions

The problem of strategic stability of cooperative solutions for multistage games is studied. The sufficient conditions related to discount factors are presented, which guarantee the existence of Nash or strong Nash equilibria in such games and therefore guarantee the strategic stability of cooperative solutions. The deviating payoffs of players are given directly, which are related closely to these conditions and avoid the loss of super-additivity of a class of general characteristic functions. As an illustration, Nash and strong Nash equilibria are found for the repeated infinite stage Prisoner’s dilemma game.

scholarly journals Owen-stable coalition partitions in games with vector payoffs

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Василий Гусев ◽  
Vasily Gusev ◽  
Владимир Мазалов ◽  
Vladimir Mazalov
Keyword(s):  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Owen Value ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
Vector Payoffs ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Games With Vector Payoffs

The paper is devoted to the study of multicriteria cooperative games with vector payoffs and coalition partition. The imputation which is based on the concept of the Owen value is proposed. We use it for the definition of stable coalition partition for bicriteria games. In three person cooperative game with 0-1 characteristic function the conditions under which the coalition partition is stable are found.

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